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INTRODUCTION

Photography -is a unique medium. It is simultaneously an art and a
science. And it pushes the boundaries of both disciplines: it initiated nothing
short of a revolution in the visual arts; as a science, it is perhaps the "most
valuable invention since that of the printing press."' But this blend of art and
science, intriguing as it may be, also produces problems. In fact, in the late
1800s, when photography was in its infancy, the art establishment summarily
rejected it as an art form. Most artists simply could not accept the idea that
photographs deserved the same esteem as paintings, drawings, prints, and
sculptures. Scientists were similarly confounded. They delighted in the physics
and chemistry of photography, in the problems of negatives and positives, and
in the quest for a permanently-fixed image, but they were largely incapable of
attending to photography's aesthetic dimension. In the words of an unidentified
scientist of the era, "[p]hotography would be a most interesting subject, were it
not for the pictures." 2
Today, the scientific problems photography faced in its early years
have been solved. The tensions between photography's artistic and scientific
attributes have been dissipated. And the controversy over photography as a fine
art has been put to rest. Or has it? Is it possible that some of the prejudices
against photography as an art form persist to this day? That they infect our
application of copyright principles to original works that happen to be
photographs? This Article explores those questions.
It begins with a little history. At the turn of the last century, a
philosophical battle raged between those who viewed photography as an art
form and those who viewed it as something more mundane. The proponents of
photography-as-art eventually won the battle, but their victory was, at first,
Pyrrhic. It was based on a "pictorial" ethic, a belief that photography was an art
form only insofar as it resembled the traditional arts. 3 In other words,
photography was art only insofar as it was un-photographic. Pictorialism, thus,
had its limitations. And some photographers recognized that fact. They

HELMUT GERNSHEIM & ALISON GERNSHEiM, TiE HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY 11 (1969).
2

Id.

See infra Part II.B.
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advocated for "straight photography," an aesthetic that was true to the camera's
distinctive qualities and, in particular, its realism. Today, straight photography
is the dominant photographic aesthetic. Unfortunately, copyright law has not
fully embraced it.
In 1865, Congress expressly listed photographs in the Copyright Act.4
When litigants challenged that legislation some twenty years later, they did so
on the grounds that machines produced photographs, not human beings, and
photographs, therefore, lacked originality. The Supreme Court disagreed,
declaring that photographs were authored by people, that they, in other words,
had originators, and that they accordingly satisfied the Constitution's
originality requirement.6 The Court based its decision on the then-prevailing
pictorial ethic: photographs were original because photographers used models,
elicited expressions, posed sitters, staged backgrounds, and otherwise altered
reality.7 Subsequently, courts declared all sorts of photographs, both pictorial
and straight, original.8 Now, in fact, almost any photograph, save those that
deliberately attempt exact duplication of copyrighted works, can satisfy the
originality requirement.9
A pictorial ethic has, however, lingered in other areas of copyright
law.'o It appears in particular in the fact-expression dichotomy, a doctrine
requiring that facts be free for the taking, that copyright laws protect only the
expression of facts and not the facts themselves." This doctrine emanates from
the Copyright Act's ultimate goal: to promote the progress of science and the
arts. Scientists and artists build on those who come before them.12 Thus,
allowing scientists and artists to freely take facts from their predecessors
promotes the public good; the fact-expression dichotomy is crucial to the
balance the Copyright Act strikes between rewarding and promoting
innovation.' 3
But the fact-expression dichotomy, as applied to straight photography,
has several shortcomings. First, it uses rules designed for literature on a
medium that is fundamentally different from literature. Take, for example, an
academic paper. The individual words may represent unprotected facts, but the
phrasing of those words is copyrightable expression. In the face of an

4
6
7

8

9

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.

10

See infra Part IV.

I

See infra Part IV.

12

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.

13
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infringement claim, it is a relatjvely simple process to distinguish words from
phrasing. But, as many courts have noted, the exercise is not so simple in the
case of a straight photograph. Straight photographs' subject matter, after all, is
factual, and the question where the facts end and the expression begins is a
thorny one. In fact, a photograph's facts and expression are, arguably,
inseparably wed. Visual facts are not discrete packages, like facts expressed in
words.
Second, the fact-expression dichotomy privileges pictorial photographs
over straight ones. This occurs most commonly in the context of the fair use
defense. Courts applying the second fair use factor-"the nature of the
copyrighted work"' 4-reflexively deem pictorial photographs creative and
straight ones factual. They do not typically acknowledge that works can be both
factual and creative. This means that straight photographs automatically receive
less protection from copying than pictorial photographs.
Finally, courts often use the fact-expression dichotomy clumsily, as a
proxy for public-interest rationales. They designate a straight photograph
factual even though it displays all of the same characteristics that would,
outside the public-interest context, result in a finding of creativity. In other
words, they rely on a legal fiction. They do so because they recognize that the
defendant should be allowed to disseminate the copyrighted work, often
because it is newsworthy, but the copyright laws have not given them the tools
to express that rationale directly.
Ultimately, the fact-expression dichotomy provides limited copyright
protection for straight photographs, which are, by today's standards, highly
creative and valuable to the public discourse. The courts need a moreprincipled approach. This Article attempts to present one. Part II provides
historical context, describing early arguments for and against photography as a
fine art, explaining how photography gained legitimacy as an art form through
pictorialism, and discussing the ultimate shift to straight photography. Part III
provides legal context, describing how the Supreme Court used a pictorialist
rationale, early on, to hold that photographs could meet the Copyright Act's
originality requirement. Part IV describes the problem: how today, in an era
where a straight photographic aesthetic predominates, pictorialism still
influences courts' rationales.
Part V presents a solution. It suggests that courts evaluating straight
photographs use a "compositional-equivalence" test to isolate facts from
expression. If a secondary work duplicates a copyrighted work's compositionif, stated differently, there is compositional equivalence between the two
works-the defendant has taken protected expression. Part V also suggests that,
when it comes to news photographs or photographs with potentially high
public-interest value, there are two situations in which the public's interest
should trump the copyright holder's interest: when a photograph has become

14

17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006).
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"evidentiary in nature" and when a photograph contains "demonstrative
expression."
The first situation, where a photograph has become evidentiary in
nature, occurs when a photograph helps prove the truth of a matter, important
to the public, that is in controversy. For example, the infamous photograph of
former U.S. Senator Gary Hart with Donna Rice on his lap suggested that
allegations of Hart's infidelity, which he had vehemently denied, were more
likely true than not. In addition, the photograph was one-of-a-kind: it was,
essentially, the only proof the public had at its disposal. The second situation,
where a photograph contains demonstrative expression, occurs when a
photograph's expressive elements, themselves, have become controversial or
are of interest to the public for some reason other than their aesthetic appeal.
When, for instance, Time Magazine ran a mug shot of O.J. Simpson on its
cover, with his complexion artificially darkened, the public was interested in
the photograph's aesthetics not because of aesthetic appeal, per se, but because
the aesthetics were demonstrative of something other than artistic expression,
i.e., racism.
In both situations, the public should probably have access to the
photographs in order to adequately analyze the controversies-not, as current
law would have it, because the photographs lack expression. The
compositional-equivalence test, and the tests for evidentiary status and
demonstrative expression, would enable courts to approach straight
photographs in a more-principled, more-modem manner. They also seem to
explain many of the precedents in the straight-photography arena better than
the rules the courts are purporting to use.
II. PHOTOGRAPHY'S BATTLE FOR FINE-ARTS STATUS

This Part provides historical background that will enable the reader to
fully appreciate the arguments presented later in the paper. It describes the
public's initial reaction to the invention of photography, and how the public at
first rejected this new vocation as an art form, and gives insight into why the
law has struggled to account for photography as an expressive medium.
Although human beings have been acquainted with certain fundamental
photographic principles, such as the camera-obscura phenomenon,s for
thousands of years,' it was not until 1839 that an artist, Louis Jacques Mande
15
Such a camera consists, in its simplest form, of a room with a small hole, or "aperture," in
the wall. Sunlight passing through the aperture projects the view outside the room, upside-down,

onto the opposite wall. BARBARA LONDON UPTON & JOHN UPTON, PHOTOGRAPHY 350 (3d ed.

1985); see Anonymous, Diagram of Camera Obscura (drawing), available at
http://lashp.files.wordpress.com/201 1/01/camera obscura_1 .jpg.
16
Many ancient scholars, all across the globe, wrote about the camera obscura. One of the
earliest to do so was the Greek scholar, Aristotle. See GERNSHEIM & GERNSHEIM, supra note 1, at

17. In 1038, Middle-Eastern scholar Hassan ibn Hassan (also known as "Ibn Al-Haitham" and
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Daguerre,17 presented the world with the first commercially viable photograph.
He called his invention the "daguerreotype." 8 It was extremely lifelike, with
realistic gradations in tone. Its chiaroscuro, luminosity, tonal range, and detail
were impressive, even by today's standards.19
And the art world took notice. In fact, painters and engravers feared
that the new technology would render their talents obsolete.20 Paul Delaroche, a
popular French painter of the era, remarked, upon seeing a daguerreotype, that

"Alhazen") wrote about the camera obscura in his treatise, Perspectiva.Id at 13, 17. He provided
perhaps the first truly clear and scientifically-accurate written description of the device. Id at 17.
Notably, however, he did not give any indication that he was presenting novel information in
terms of the phenomenon itself, suggesting, as stated in the text, that ancient peoples were quite
familiar with it already. Id
1
It is important to note, in light of the camera's dual nature as an instrument of science and
art, that both scientists and artists contributed to its invention. In 1826, for example, the French
inventor, Nicdphore Ni6pce became the first person to permanently fix a photograph taken from
nature. See, e.g., id at 13-14, 57-58. This was the first photograph taken from nature, as opposed
to a photograph taken to reproduce an engraving. See id. at 58. It was the view outside Ni6pce's
window. JAY BOCHNER, AN AMERICAN LENS, SCENES FROM ALFRED STIEGLITZ's NEW YORK
SECESSION 2 (2005); see also Joseph Nicdphore Nidpce, View from the Window at Le Gras (circa
1826) (photograph), available at http://cool.conservation-us.org/byorg/abbey/an/an26/an263/an26-307.html. Some historians date the first photograph (by the same photographer) at 1824;
the better view, however, is that Ni6pce succeeded in producing the first true photograph in 1826.
GERNSHEIM & GERNSHEIM, supra note 3, at 57-59. The 1826 photograph was, in contrast to
previous attempts, permanently-fixed; in other words, it could be exposed to light without ever
darkening. UPTON & UPTON, supra note 15, at 351.
1

GERNSHEIM & GERNSHEIM, supra note 1, at 67; see also Louis-Jacques-Mand6 Daguerre,

Still Life (1837) (daguerreotype), available at http://kids.britannica.com/comptons/art-3117/StillLife-daguerreotype-by-Louis-Jacques-Mande-Daguerre-1837-in.
1
See UPTON & UPTON, supra note 15, at 352. However, developing and fixing
daguerreotypes required highly-toxic chemicals. Id. Moreover, daguerreotypes were difficult to
view. Id They were copper plates coated in silver that was mirror-like. Id. Thus, the "image
could be seen clearly only from certain angles." Id In addition, there was no way to easily
produce copies. Id Less than three weeks after the daguerreotype's debut, William Henry Fox
Talbot, an English amateur scientist, demonstrated a technique he called the "calotype," which
had several advantages over the daguerreotype. Id. at 354. In particular, calotypes involved a
negative-positive process and were, therefore, reproducible. Id This was a necessary precursor to
modem photographic technology. Unfortunately, Talbot's invention did not take off with the
public, probably because the calotype's image quality struck many viewers as inferior to that of
the daguerreotype. Id Nevertheless, although Talbot would never know it, his invention "became
the basis of modem photographic chemistry." Id. Of course, the switch to digital photography
was a radical departure from older technologies. Digital technology converts light into binary
digits and circumvents much of the developing processes, for film and prints, that traditional
technology required. TODD GUSTAVSON, CAMERA 340 (2009). Kodak produced the first digital

camera surprisingly early, in-house, in 1975. Id at 338. It offered the first digital, single-lensreflex camera for professionals in 1991, and the first more-simple digital camera for ordinary
consumers in 1997. Id. at 340, 342.
20

See GERNSHEIM & GERNSHEIM, supra note 1, at 70.
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"'painting is dead!"' 21 But photography had a long way to go to stand side-byside as an equal with painting and other fine arts. In America, especially, the
public refused for many years to view photography as an art form.
Alfred Stieglitz was the man who changed all of this. Today, he is
probably best known as Georgia O'Keeffe's husband,22 but, in the early 1900s,
he "was a figure of mythic proportions." 23 He was "a giant in the art world."2 4
And he was the single most important warrior25 in the battle between those who
viewed photography as merely a utilitarian endeavor and those who saw its
potential as art. One commentator even suggests that Stieglitz had more impact
on American art than anyone before or since:
Alfred Stieglitz . .. is perhaps the most important figure in the

history of visual arts in America. That is certainly not to say
that he was the greatest artist America has ever produced.
Rather, through his many roles-as a great photographer, as a
discoverer and promoter of photographers and of artists in
other media, and as a publisher, patron, and collector-he had
a greater impact on American art than any other person has
had.26
As this commentator aptly put it, Stieglitz's impact on American art
was far-reaching and cannot be underestimated. It extended well beyond
photography and into painting, sculpture, and all kinds of modem art. But, for
purposes of this paper, it is Stieglitz's role in the debate about photography as
an art form that is most important. The next two Sections will discuss that
debate, and how Stieglitz figured into it, in more detail.

21

Id

Stieglitz was significantly older than O'Keeffe. Thus, he was in his prime of life and at the
height of his fame before O'Keeffe had become the household name that she is today; in other
words, her more-recent and perhaps more-lasting fame has eclipsed his.
23
ROXANA ROBINSON, GEORGIA O'KEEFFE: A LIFE 140 (1990).
22

24

Id.

Groups rarely owe credit for their accomplishments to one individual, but the PhotoSecession-a group devoted to elevating photography to a fine art--owes it to Stieglitz. He was
the Photo-Secession's "unchallenged motivating force," and he supplied its ideological
framework. His labor, his magnetic personality, and his networking all made the Photo-Secession
a powerful force in the art world. He had his faults, but must be credited for nearly singlehandedly raising American photography within a very short time period to a position of
international prominence such that it not only equaled but exceeded developments in Europe.
WILLIAM INNES HOMER, ALFRED STIEGLITZ AND THE PHOTO-SECESSION 160 (1983).
25

26

ALFRED STIEGLITZ, STIEGLITZ ON PHOTOGRAPHY: His SELECTED ESSAYS AND NOTES ix

(Richard Whelan 2000).
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The Arguments Against Photographyas a Fine Art

In its early days, photography struck many people as not quite science
and not quite art, and as inferior to both: 'a handmaiden to science and art."' 27
One group of critics declared that photography had no hope of "resulting in
works which could ... ever be comared with those works which are the fruits
of intelligence and the study of art." Another stated glibly that "[p]hotography
as a fad is well-nigh on its last legs, thanks principally to the bicycle craze."29
Many people believed that a bad painting was more art than a good
photograph. 30 An anecdote involving Stieglitz sums up the attitude: when
Stieglitz suggested to Luigi Palma di Cesnola, an antiquities collector, that
photographs could be art, "Cesnola gasped, 'Mr. Stieglitz, you won't insist that
a photograph can possibly be a work of art!"' 3 1
Many of the people who held these views were, themselves, artists and
art lovers. This is not as surprising as it may, at first blush, seem. For centuries,
a painter's goal had been to reproduce reality. But the camera could reproduce
reality better than a painting, even in the hands of an amateur; thus, painters
and their patrons were threatened by the new device. 32 French poet Charles
Baudelaire worried, in fact, that photography would destroy the visual arts:
'By invading the territories of art, this industry has become art's most mortal
enemy. If photography is allowed to supplement art in some of its functions[,]
it will soon have supplanted or corrupted it altogether."' 33 In short, the camera
scared traditionalists, and they argued, either out of earnestly held beliefs or as
a justification for their attacks on the new discipline, that it was industrial or
"soulless" instead of art.3 4
Circumstances did not help matters. By the late 1800s, many schools
taught photography, but their clientele was engineers, military personnel,
27
GERNSHEIM & GERNSHEIM, supra note 1,at 456, 459 (quoting PETER HENRY EMERSON, THE
DEATH OF NATURALISTIC PHOTOGRAPHY (1890) (referring to Emerson's own, earlier book,
Naturalistic Photography, in which he had advocated passionately for photography as a fine
art)).
28
UPTON & UPTON, supra note 15, at 372.
29
Alfred Stieglitz, The Hand Camera-Its Present Importance, in PHOTOGRAPHY INPRINT:
WRITINGS FROM 1816 TO THE PRESENT 214 (Vicki Goldberg ed. 1988).
30
BOCHNER, supra note 17, at 26.
31
ROBINSON, supra note 23, at 63 (quoting DOROTHY NORMAN, ALFRED STIEGLITZ: AN
AMERICAN SEER 67 (1973)). Cesnola was not solely an antiquities collector; he was also, at one
time or another, a soldier, amateur archaeologist, ambassador, and teacher.
32
See id. at 63-64. Of course, photography could not, in its early days, produce full-color
images, but the threat to painting existed nonetheless, in part because many photographers handcolored their prints.
3
GERNSHEIM & GERNSHEIM, supra note 1, at 243 (quoting Baudelaire's review of the Salon
of 1859).
34
Id. at 243, 248.
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architects, physicians, and other science-oriented professionals.3 s Moreover,
most portraitists were interested mainly in making a living; they had never been
formally educated in their discipline, let alone in the more-established arts. 36
Thus, their work was not very high-quality. Finally, many people were
accustomed to photographs that were purely scientific or commercial, showing
such things as ruins, antiquities, and landscapes. They saw photographs as a
means of visual reporting, not as a means of visual expression. 9
B.

The Arguments for Photographyas a FineArt

Those who saw photography as expressive and artistic probably had the
better case, but they struggled to find the most persuasive argument to advance
their position. They initially argued, with great success, that pictorial
photographs, those that looked like paintings, were art. Eventually, however,
after recognizing various shortcomings in the pictorial ethic, they argued that
straight photographs-those that were true to the mechanics of the camera, to
its lens and film and realism-thosethat did not seek to copy the aesthetics of
another art form like painting-were art. This attitudinal shift from a pictorial
ethic to an ethic favoring straight photography is relevant to the present-day
legal regime governing photography because the law never really adopted the
shift: the courts have not quite figured out how to accommodate straight
photographs as highly-expressive works entitled to copyright protection as
stringent as that afforded to pictorial photographs.
1.

pictorialism: attempting to imitate the traditional fine arts

At first, those who believed that photographs could be art homed in on
an argument based on "mimesis," the imitative representation of the natural
world. At first, this argument makes sense. After all, photography's principal
attribute is its ability to accurately reflect reality.
The proponents of this position did not, however, base their arguments
on photography's unique attributes; rather, they looked at the established fine
arts and at painting in particular. Paintings at that time were largely mimetic:
they were more-or-less realistic in their depiction of people and scenes. Many
photographers argued that photographs should resemble paintings. If they did,
then photographers could argue that photographs were art because they looked
like art.

35

Id at 23 1.

36

See id. at 126.

37

Id

38

See id. at 126-27.
See ROBERT DorY,

39

PHOTOGRAPHY 57 (reprint

PHOTO-SECESSION:

STIEGLITZ AND

THE FINE-ART MOVEMENT IN

ed., Dover Publ'ns, 1978) (1960).
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This position was variously termed "High Art photography" 40 and
"pictorialism."41 Admittedly, it went a long way toward establishing
photography as an art form.42 But it had its drawbacks. For one thing, the
paintings of the day were not really as naturalistic as people supposed. Many of
them were allegorical. They told stories. They "illustrate[d] scenes from
literature, drama, and history."A3 They were contrived, not candid,
representations of life. Painters used professional models, instead of real
subjects-even for scenes of supposedly everyday people. Such scenes were
sentimental and idealized, and "genuine country people were [deemed] . . . too

clumsy" 4 4 to use as sitters. In short, painters were striving for, and making
claims to, naturalism, but faking it.4 5
And the pictorialists followed suit. Henry Peach Robinson was the
most influential pictorialist. 46 He urged photographers to arrange their subjects,
to tell stories, and to convey morals; he also advocated for the handmanipulation of negatives and photographs.4 7 Photographers acceded. They
presented sentimental views of daily life using models, costumes, and painted
backdrops. 4 8 They manipulated their photographs to look like paintings, by
using techniques such as composite printing, where multiple negatives are
combined to give the appearance of a single photograph, 4 9 and by adding brush
strokes to create a painting-like surface texture.
Pictorial photography was, essentially, "a conscious emulation of
pictures made by the brush, the pencil, or the etcher's burin."50 The pictorialists
patterned their aesthetics after those employed by the most-venerated painters
of the era. 1 In fact, "[n]othing delighted [the pictorialists] more than the
exclamation, 'By Jove, that doesn't look a bit like a photograph!"' 5 2
Many pictorialists even abandoned one of the photograph's main
attributes-its potential for clarity-in favor of hazy, dream-like images. 5 3
40
41

42

See, e.g., GERNSHEIM & GERNSHEIM, supra note 1, at 456.
See, e.g., UPTON & UPTON, supra note 15, at 374.
See HOMER, supra note 25, at 155.

43
GERNSHEIM & GERNSHEIM, supra note 1, at 244 (discussing photographs that imitate
allegorical painting).
44
Id. at 248.
45
See id. at 248-50.
46
See HOMER, supra note 25, at 9.
47
See id.
48

UPTON & UPTON, supra note 15, at 373; see also BOCHNER, supra note 17, at 2.

49

UPTON& UPTON, supra note 15, at 373, 376.
DOTY, supra note 39, at 28.

50

51

Id

52

GERNSIEIM & GERNSHEIM, supra note 1, at 463.

53

See DoTY, supra note 39, at 28.
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They wanted to "remove the sense of the mechanical" in their artwork and
undermine the camera's "just-about-perfect rendering." 54 If people were
reluctant to see photographs as art because of their technical refinement (e.g., a
perfectly detailed representation of Egyptian ruins), then photographers would
give them something else. They would not merely record facts. They would
express themselves in a painterly fashion. And it worked: by 1910, many
people viewed photography as an art form.ss
2.

straight photography: developing a true photographic aesthetic

At first, "pictorial" simply meant photographs that were art rather than
document; it was a way of differentiating art from non-art.56 Thus, Stieglitzever the advocate for photography as art-initially embraced pictorialism. One
author even describes him as the movement's "leader and catalyst.""
Eventually, however, he and others began to see pictorialism's
limitations. Pictorialism posits that photographs are artistic only insofar as they
look un-photographic. The more forward-thinking photographers saw the error
and irony in that position. They began to experiment with what they called
"straight photography," something that "was more honest, more true to the
clear optical image that the camera was naturally inclined to produce....
cherishing. . . the very characteristics of the medium that did not resemble
painting."58 They rejected handwork, such as retouching and composite
printing, in favor of images that accurately recorded visual facts.59 They began
to build a new aesthetic geared specifically to the photographic medium. 60 The
term "pictorial" became a derogatory term, describing "fawning attempts to
recreate the . .. day's conventional painting,"'6 ' akin to what we might refer to
today as "kitsch."
Photographers who adopted a straight-photography ethic include such
greats as Ansel Adams, Imogen Cunningham, and Edward Weston.62 Stieglitz,
though, was unquestionably the movement's leader. And his principal vehicle
for promoting straight photography was the Photo-Secession, "a select body of
American photographers who rocked the foundations of the conservative

54
5

56

5
58

BOCHNER, supra note 17.
HOMER, supra note 25, at 155.
See BOCHNER, supra note 17, at 39, 88.
UPTON & UPTON, supra note 15, at 375.
HOMER, supra note 25, at 155.

60

Id. at 9-11.

61

BOCHNER, supra note 17, at 39.
UPTON & UPTON, supra note 15, at 376.

62
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branch of their discipline."63 Stieglitz created the group in 1902" as a way of
rebelling against a pictorialist aesthetic rooted in romantic, Victorian-era
painting.6 5 He and other Secessionists wanted photography to be considered an
art form, but they wanted it to be considered such on its own terms. They did
not want to merely replicate aesthetics that were "not ... intrinsically
photographic aesthetics.", They wanted "an authenticity" that was true to
"their machinery of lens and film."67 They realized that photography's "chief
contribution to art lies in its realism." 68
3.

straight photography and the moment of meaningfulness

One way that Stieglitz and the Photo-Secession promoted straight
photography was to organize shows that featured the style. In 1910, for
example, they organized a landmark show in Buffalo, New York, displaying
photography alongside avant-garde painting. 69 The show critiqued both

63
HOMER, supra note 25, at page 1 of unnumbered preface. Members of the Photo-Secession
included Gertrude Kasebier, Minor White, Joseph Keiley, Edward Steichen, Frank Eugene, and
Alvin Langdon Coburn, along with Stieglitz. Id. at 57. The Photo-Secession's official publication
and mouthpiece was Camera Work. Id. at 111-12. The name "Photo-Secession" came from two
European groups, the British "Linked Ring" and the German "Secession." See id at 32-33, 52.
Both groups saw themselves as seceding from the art establishment, as rejecting the conventions
of the period, including, for the non-photographic arts, naturalism and representation. For
Stieglitz, "[tihe idea of a radical group of aesthetes was highly appealing, and in choosing the
name [Photo-Secession, he] .. . established his alliance with the revolutionary elements in the
international art world." ROBINsoN, supra note 23, at 65. Another reason Stieglitz had for
creating the Photo-Secession was that he wanted to wrench control of the American photographic
movement from his Boston-based rival, F. Holland Day, and to keep the center of its activities in
New York City. HOMER, supra note 25, at 42.
64
HOMER, supra note 25, at page 1 of unnumbered preface.
65
BOCHNER, supra note 17, at 87.
66
Id
67

Id. at 40.

68

See GERNSHEIM & GERNSHEIM, supra note 1, at 244.

69
The camera was fomenting a revolution in the fine arts: "[p]aradoxically, the availability of
a breathtakingly precise reproduction of visual reality had rendered it valueless.. . . [S]omething
more than literal realism was required of' the established arts. ROBINSON, supra note 23, at 64.
Enter avant-garde, or modern, art. Artists working in this tradition abandoned mimesis in favor of
abstraction. HOMER, supra note 25, at 155. At the same time the Photo-Secession was developing
a straight-photography ethic, avant-garde artists, working in the traditional media of painting,
drawing, printmaking, and sculpture, were embracing the "unphotographic," DoTY, supra note
39, at 50, or "antiphotographic," BOCHNER, supra note 17, at 79, in their work. They began to
abstract reality, by, among other things, flattening or fracturing it, heightening its colors and
textures, and even by playing with the idea of a multi-dimensional world. Stieglitz loved it. And
he all but introduced the genre to America. He owned a gallery, "The Little Galleries of the
Photo-Secession," in New York City. HOMER, supra note 25, at 118. It would be hard to
exaggerate its importance. It was the first American venue for figures who are, simply,
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representational painting and pictorial photography which sought to copy such
painting. It also presented photographs in a single line, one artist at a time,
showing the artist's evolution. By showing that "a photographer could have her
own style, the myth of the objective, inexpressive camera was neatly
exploded."70
Stieglitz himself had "extraordinary skill with the camera." 7 But his
excellence did not come from showiness, from some sort of contrived, selfconscious attempt to create "art." On the contrary, he produced simple, honest
images that were true to the photographic medium. He showed the world as it
was, without romanticizing it. To do that, and to do it well, he trained himself
to take pictures "at a precise moment of meaningfulness." 72
In Winter-Fifth Avenue, for example, Stieglitz photographed a horsedrawn carriage and its driver on a snowy day in New York City. 73 Carriage
tracks crisscross the snow-covered street. Snow falls directionally; one can
sense the wind driving it hard, not only downward, but laterally as well. The
driver is frozen in time, his hand raised. It is one of the first action shots:
The subject has not posed, has not already been for some time
in the attitude that will be the image; it is one of the first times
an exposure has been devoted so clearly to conveying the flow
of changing event, the stilled moment culled from change in
order to convey the change. The anecdote, true or false, of
waiting in the storm for three hours for this image to compose
itself, reminds us that, for Stieglitz, only one special twentyfifth of a second in particular would tell the story of the flow as
he knew he saw it.

luminaries in the art world: Henri Matisse, Auguste Rodin, Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec, Paul
Cezanne, Henri Rousseau, Pierre-Auguste Renoir, Edouard Manet, Pablo Picasso, Constantine
Brancusi, Georges Braque, and Georgia O'Keeffe. BOCHNER, supra note 17, at 50, 62; DOTY,
supra note 39, at 45, 52, 58; ROBINSON, supra note 23, at 103.
70
BOCHNER, supra note 17, at 43.
7
HOMER, supra note 25, at page 1 of unnumbered preface.
72 BOCHNER, supra note 17, at 155; see also HOMER, supra note 25, at 155 (discussing how a
photographer must "skillfully seize[] 'pictures' from the infinite possibilities offered by the
visual world").
7
Alfred
Stieglitz,
Winter-Fifth Avenue (1893)
(photograph), available at
http://www.moma.org/collection/browse results.php?criteria=0%3AAD%3AE%3A5664&
page number=4&template id= l&sortorder=1.
74
BOCHNER, supra note 17, at 13. Another author describes Stieglitz's The Rag Picker
similarly, as a meaningful moment skillfully culled from the flow of time: "[A] moment later, the
poignant action would have passed." HOMER, supra note 25, at 19. For a reproduction of the
photograph in question, see Stieglitz, supra 73.
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The same could be said for The Steerage, Stieglitz's signature piece,
taken in 1907," arguably one of the most important photographs of the
twentieth century. It, like Winter-Fifth Avenue, culls a precise, meaningful
moment from the flow of time. It depicts a ship's steerage section, housing the
lowest-paying passengers. Stieglitz memorialized the scene not as a
documentarian, but as an artist:
There were men and women and children on the lower deck of
the steerage.

. ..

On the upper deck, looking over the railing,

there was a young man with a straw hat. The shape of the hat
was round. He was watching the men and women and children
on the lower steerage deck . ...

A round straw hat, the

[smokestack] leaning left, the stairway leaning right, the white
drawbridge with its railings made of circular chains-white
suspenders crossing on the back of a man in the steerage
below, round shapes of iron machinery, a mast cutting into the
sky, making a triangular shape. I stood spellbound for a while,
looking and looking. Could I photograph what I felt ... ? I saw
shapes related to each other. I saw a picture of shapes and
underlying that the feeling I had about life.76
He saw himself working firmly within the tradition of other fine arts, such as
painting:
And as I was deciding, would I try to put down this seemingly
new vision that held me-people, the common people, the
feeling of ship and ocean and sky and the feeling of release that
I was away from the mob called the rich-Rembrandt came
into my mind and I wondered would he have felt as I was
feeling.
He only had one plate with him, only one opportunity to take the
photograph that had planted itself in his mind's eye. He rushed to his cabin,
gathered his equipment, and returned to the bow. Miraculously, he found his
picture intact: "[I was] out of breath, wondering whether the man with the straw
hat had moved or not. If he had, the picture I had seen would no longer be. The
relationship of shapes as I wanted them would have been disturbed and the

7s
See, e.g., DOTY, supra note 39, at 119 (presenting the photograph with a 1907 date).
Stieglitz did not publish The Steerage until 1911, in Camera Work. KATHERINE HOFFMAN,
STIEGLITZ: A BEGINNING LIGHT 236 (2004). For a reproduction of the photograph in question, see
at
available
(photograph),
(1907)
The
Steerage
Stieglitz,
Alfred
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/33.43.419.

76

HOFFMAN, supra note 75, at 233-34.

n

Id. at 234.
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picture lost." 7 8 Thankfully, no one had changed position and Stieglitz was able
to give the world a new photographic masterpiece.
III. PHOTOGRAPHY AND ORIGINALITY: A PICTORIALIST RATIONALE EVOLVES
INTO A STANDARD THAT "ALMOST ANY" PHOTOGRAPH CAN SATISFY

Photography's ephemeral qualities confounded the legal community in
much the same way that they confounded the art world. This Part therefore
discusses the legal response to the invention of photography. It starts with the
original Copyright Act itself. Then, it examines among other cases, the 1884
Burrow-Giles79 and the 1921 Jewelers' Circularso cases, which both analyzed
whether photographs could satisfy the Constitution's originality requirement. It
ends with a discussion of the current state of the originality requirement as it
applies to photographs.
The Constitution directs Congress, in Article I, "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 8 ' Congress obeyed this directive in 1790, shortly after the
Constitution's ratification, passing the first Copyright Act.82
That Act, not surprisingly, did not provide for copyrighting
photographs, as the camera had not yet been invented. In 1826, however,
Nic6phore Ni6pce produced the first true photograph.8 3 Thus, Congress had an
opportunity, at least in theory, to address photography in its 1831 general
revision of the Act, but it did not do so.84 This may have been because many
people still saw photography as a science rather than as an art. At the time, in
fact, patents and licenses were applied not only to the camera and ancillary
chemical processes, but to photographs as well.s In 1865, however, Congress

78

Id.

7

Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 11l U.S. 53, 54 (1884).
Jewelers' Circular Publ'g Co. v. Keystone Publ'g Co., 274 F. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd
281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).
81
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
82
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003).
80

8
See, e.g., BOCHNER, supra note 17; GERNSHEIM & GERNSHEIM, supra note 1, at 13-14, 58;
NEWHALL, supra note n.*, at 16; UPTON & UPTON, supra note 15, at 351. This photograph was

crude and blurry in comparison to the later daguerreotype. Compare Nidpce, supra note 17, with
Daguerre, supra note 18.
84
See 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1-23 (2009). Congress could have also
added photography through amendment; it amended various portions of the Act in 1834, 1846,
1855, 1856, 1859, and 1861. See id. §§ 1:24-1:29.
85

See, e.g., GERNSHEIM & GERNSHEM, supra note 1, at 162 (describing agreement forbidding

photographer from giving away prints without first obtaining permission).
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did extend copyright protection to photographs. 86 It had been thirty-nine years
since Ni6pce took the first photograph and twenty-six years since Daguerre
gave the world his daguerreotype.
A.

Burrow-Giles Introduces a PictorialistEthic into the Originality
Inquiry

In 1884, almost twenty years later, the Supreme Court entertained a
challenge to that legislation. The question was whether photographs contain
sufficient originality to be subject to copyright. The Copyright Act did not
explicitly mention originality, but most courts understood that an originality
requirement flowed, necessarily, from the Constitution's use of the word
"author"; an author means an "originator" and, hence, originality. This
originality requirement is "the sine qua non of copyright."8 Courts have
described it as "the very 'premise"' and a "bedrock principle" of copyright
law.
The case that challenged photographs' copyrightability was BurrowGiles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.90 The plaintiff was Napoleon Sarony, a
professional photographer. He had photographed writer and poet Oscar
Wilde.9 1 The defendant, Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., had reproduced
Sarony's copyrighted photograph, without permission, selling some 85,000
copies of it.9
Burrow-Giles argued that it could not be liable for copyright
infringement because photographs were not copyrightable, and that Congress
had erred in legislating otherwise. It relied on Article I of the Constitution,
asserting that "a photograph is [neither] a writing nor the production of an
author." 9 4 It took the same position as those who refused to see photography as
an art form, that photographs were merely mechanical, not expressive: "a
photograph being a reproduction, on paper, of the exact features of some
natural object, or of some person, is not a writing of which the producer is the

86

PATRY, supra note 84, § 1:3 1.

See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351-52 (1991).
88 Id. at 348.
89 Id. at 347 (quoting, in the first instance, Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d
1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981)).
90
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
9' See Napolean Sarony, Oscar Wilde No. 18 (1882) (photograph), available at
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/indelible-may-2004.html.
92
BuTow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54 (1884).
9
Id. at 55.
87

94

Id. at 56.
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author."95 And it derided photography for "the accuracy of [its] representation
being its highest merit." 96
The Court disagreed, expressing "no doubt that the [C]onstitution is
broad enough to cover an act authorizing copyright of photographs, so far as
they are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author." 97 It
noted that the only reason Congress had not included photographs in earlier
versions of the Copyright Act was that "photography, as an art, was then
unknown." 98 It accepted the lower court's description of Sarony's photograph
as "harmonious" and "graceful." 99 And it found sufficient authorship, or
originality, in Sarony's photograph, such that it was susceptible to copyright, in
Sarony's posing Wilde, "'selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and
other various accessories in [the] photograph, arranging the subject so as to
present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, [and]
suggesting and evoking the desired expression.""o
Burrow-Giles was rightly decided. Sarony's photograph of Wilde was
original and copyrightable, and Burrow-Giles violated the copyright laws when
it pirated Sarony's material and sold it for profit. Nevertheless, the case is a
product of its time in three important ways.
First, it was litigated at a time when the pictorialist ethic was the
predominate, if not the only, argument in favor of photography as an art form.
And the Court's opinion is firmly rooted in that ethic.10 ' The opinion designates
as expressive those parts of the photograph that were pictorialist in nature: a
posed model, a contrived scene, costuming, and other theatrics. Sarony was not
working in a straight-photography tradition, and that, apparently, was a good
thing in terms of his photograph's copyrightability. If Sarony had taken a

95

Id

96

Id at 59.

9

Id at 58.

9

Id at 60.

Id.
1oo Id. (quoting the lower court); cf Falk v. Donaldson, 57 F. 32, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1893)
(identifying similar pictorialist qualities as those that made photograph at issue, of actress Julia
Marlowe, original). The Court's list of copyrightable elements seems to be, in one writer's
words, "somehow prephotographic. . . with no mention whatsoever of a camera." Mitch
Tuchman, Inauthentic Works of Art: Why Bridgeman May Ultimately be Irrelevant to Art
Museums, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 287, 298 (2001).
101 On the other hand, the Court does not rely on the handwork so common among pictorialists
(composite printing, negative manipulation, the addition of brush strokes to prints, etc.). See
Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright's Response to the Invention of
Photography,65 U. PITr. L. REv. 385, 390 (2004). Perhaps this is simply because the photograph
at issue did not obviously evidence such manipulation. Moreover, Sarony did not involve himself
in the printing process; he knew nothing about the chemistry of photography. Tuchman, supra
note 100, at 295. He only set up the camera and posed the sitter. Id. He did not even always take
the pictures himself. See id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss1/11

18

Bruce: In the Language of Pictures: How Copyright Law Fails to Adequatel

IN THE LANGUAGE OF PICTURES

2012]

111

candid shot of Wilde, then the Court's rationale may not have applied at all. At
most, the Court provides two traits-and very ambiguous ones, at that-that
might support a candid photograph's copyrightability: harmony and grace.
That said, the Court deserves credit for being well-versed in the day's
most cutting-edge theories regarding art photography. The Court did not simply
accept the argument, popular among some circles at the time, that photography
was merely mechanical or industrial, and, therefore, not artistic, creative,1 or
original at all. Rather, it embraced the best, then-existing argument to the
contrary: pictorialism.
Second, the case is a product of its time because the Court, like most of
the public, was probably acquainted with photographs that were, by and large,
pseudo-scientific, commercial, or documentarian, i.e., portraiture and
photographs of such things as Native Americans, Egyptian pyramids, and the
Civil War.103 Pictorialists, of course, were trying to distance themselves from
such photographs, to appear, for instance, more painterly. There was, in other
words, a bifurcation between photographs that were seen as merely recording
facts and those that imitated the traditional fine arts. The former were not art;
the latter were. The Court seems to have embraced this bifurcation. BurrowGiles argued that photographs were produced by cameras, not by people, and
that, therefore, they were not "original" within the meaning of the Copyright
Act. Although the Court rejected this notion for all photographs, as a blanket
rule, it did observe that Burrow-Giles's argument "may be true in regard to the
ordinary production of a photograph, and that in such case a copyright is no

protection."

04

Finally, the justices themselves had undoubtedly posed for their own
portraits, as the Court was, starting in the 1880s, routinely photographed. 0 5
These portraits were done in "a studio setting complete with painted backdrops,
a peripatetic column, figured carpets, and potted ferns." 06 In fact, in 1890, six
years after the Court decided Burrow-Giles, Sarony himself photographed the
justices. 0 7 Thus, the jurists were familiar with sitting for the camera, and they

102
Many authors have criticized the notion of creativity as applied to the originality
requirement, arguing, probably rightly, that it is rooted in an inaccurate romantic vision of the
artist. See, e.g., Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 951, 980 (2004) ("The paradigmatic Romantic author was, as many commentators have
observed, a quasi-mythological genius, inspired by a divine muse while laboring in a secluded
garret.").
103 Patry suggests that Matthew Brady's Civil War photographs, which had a great impact on
the public, had something to do with Congress adding photography to the Copyright Act. See
PATRY, supranote 84, § 1:3 1.
104 Burrow-GilesLithographicCo., 111 U.S. at 59.
105
Tuchman, supra note 100, at 298-99.

106

Id. at 299.

107

id.
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could readily identify-from a sitter's perspective-with those things they
witnessed the photographer doing: providing backgrounds and props, adjusting
lighting, and eliciting expressions and poses, to name a few. The justices saw
originality, in other words, from a front-of-the-camera perspective, not from a
behind-the-camera perspective.
B.

Burrow-Giles's Progenyand the Move Away from a Strict-Pictorialist
Viewpoint

After Burrow-Giles, the originality cases involving photographs moved
away from a strict-pictorialist viewpoint. This may have been because everyday
people, including judges, had become more familiar with the camera. They had
begun, themselves, to own cameras and produce photographs. As perhaps a
consequence of these developments, the cases began to include more behindthe-camera rationales for photographic originality. They acknowledged the
originality in candid, unstaged photographs, and the inevitability of unique and
differentiable styles among individual photographers.
1.

originality and candid photographs

Courts began as early as 1897 to hold that straight photographs have
sufficient originality for copyright. In Bolles v. Outing Co.,"o for example, the
Second Circuit held that a reasonable person could conclude that a photograph
of a yacht under sail was original. The court below had directed a verdict for
the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff's copyright notice was invalid. On
appeal, the defendant advanced that same ground as well as the familiar
argument that a machine, not a man, produced the picture; according to the
defendant, "no original, intellectual conception was involved in the production
of the ... photograph."l 09
The court disagreed. It held that a reasonable juror could conclude, and
may well have to conclude, the contrary, that the photographer produced an
original, artistic work. And it did not base its holding on a pictorial ethic.
Instead, it relied on attributes inherent in straight photography: the
photographer's selection and use of venue, subject matter, light, and other
naturally occurring phenomena:
Whether a photograph is a mere manual reproduction of
subject-matter, or an original work of art, is a question of fact;
and there is certainly sufficient evidence in the present record
to justify, if not to compel, the conclusion that the one in
question embodies an exceptional degree of artistic conception

1os

77 F. 966 (2d Cir. 1897), affd, 175 U.S. 262 (1899).

109

Id. at 970 (summarizing the defendant's argument).
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and expression. It required the photographer to select and
utilize the best effects of light, cloud, water, and general
surroundings, and combine them under favorable conditions
for de icting vividly and accurately the view of a yacht under
sail.'
In 1916, in Pagano v. Chas. Beseler Co.,'11 the Southern District of
New York issued a similar ruling. The case involved a photograph of the New
York Public Library.11 2 The defendant argued that a photograph of a public
building could not be copyrighted. The idea, more broadly stated, was that
nobody could copyright "a photograph of an everyday inanimate object." 1 3
The plaintiff argued that his photograph had sufficient originality. He
contended that his concept, his interpretation of the subject matter, the library,
was original. He gave visible form to that concept, he said, by, among other
things, selecting the proper moment to snap his shutter."14
The court agreed, issuing a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the
plaintiff. Its opinion, like the Second Circuit's in Bolles, relies on a straightphotography ethic, emphasizing such things as venue, timing, lighting, framing,
positioning, and background. And it makes very clear that a candid photograph,
which freezes people and objects in certain attitudes, can be artistic:
It undoubtedly requires originality to determine just when to
take the photograph, so as to bring out the proper setting for
both animate and inanimate objects, with the adjunctive
features of light, shade, position, etc. The photograph in
question is admirable. The photographer caught the men and
women in not merely lifelike, but artistic, positions, and this is
especially true of the traffic policeman. The background,
taking in the building of the Engineers' Club and the small
trees on Forty-First street, is most pleasing, and the lights and
shades are exceedingly well done.
Thus, as of the late 1800s, both pictorial and straight photographs could
claim sufficient originality to warrant copyright protection. But the question
left open in Burrow-Giles-whether some photographs were completely
lacking in originality-was still unanswered. Bolles, like Burrow-Giles,
appears to accept the idea that some photographs were utterly lacking in

Id.; see also Charles E. Bolles, The Vigilant (circa 1895) (photographic print), available at
110
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2003678322.
111 234 F. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
112
Id. at 963.
113
2 PATRY, supra note 84, § 3:118.
114
See Pagano, 234 F. at 963-64.
115
Id. at 964.
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originality. After all, it viewed the question whether "a photograph is a mere
manual reproduction of subject-matter, or an original work of art"' 1 6 as a fact
question for the jury. Moreover, although it viewed the yacht photograph as
artistic and expressive, its description of that photograph as "the one in
question"'17 suggests that other pictures might lack those qualities.
2.

originality and the photographer's own distinctive style

In 1921, Judge Learned Hand revisited the question left open in
Burrow-Giles: are some photographs so lacking in originality that they are not
copyrightable? The case was Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone
Publishing Co., 118 and it involved a copyright dispute over a catalog of
jewelers' trademarks. The plaintiff had obtained trademarks, either from the
jewelers themselves, or from sketches he commissioned, and transferred them,
photographically, to die-cuts for printing.
Judge Hand decided Jewelers' Circulareleven years after the historic
Buffalo Show, which had destroyed the myth of machine-as-photographer by
showcasing the evolving styles of individual photographers. It was ten years
since the Photo-Secession had disbanded.1 9 Photographers, including Stieglitz,
felt that they had won the battle for fine-arts status.120 And straight work was
dominating fine-art photography. The Boston Museum of Fine Arts was on the
verge of becoming the first museum to have in its permanent collection
multiple works by a single photographer, Stieglitz.121
And the zeitgeist, the spirit of the time, seemed to influence Judge
Hand, just as an earlier zeitgeist had influenced the Burrow-Giles Court. The
argument that photographers had their own, unique style had persuaded Judge
Hand. He declared that "no photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by
the personal influence of the author, and no two will be absolutely alike." 22
And he pronounced that "[t]he suggestion that the Constitution might not
include all photographs" 23 was "overstrained."l 24 This, according to the
leading copyright treatise, "has become the prevailing view, so that . .. almost
116

Bolles, 77 F. at 970.

117

Id.

118

274 F. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).

"
The Photo-Secession never formally disbanded; it simply disappeared, in approximately
1911. DoTY, supra note 39; see HOMER, supra note 25, at 148. By 1906 or 1907, the group had a
sense that it had accomplished its mission. HOMER, supra note 25, at 122.
120
By 1910, Stieglitz believed that he had won the battle for photography as a fine art. See
DoTY, supra note 39, at 56; HOMER, supra note 25, at 144-47.
121 BOCHNER, supra note 17, at 51.
122
Jewelers' CircularPubl'g Co., 274 F. at 934.
123
Id at 935.
124
id
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125

The CurrentState of the OriginalityRequirement as It Applies to
Photographs

And this is probably as it should be. The originality bar-whether for
photographs or other works-is low. It means only that "the work owes its
creation to the author."' 2 6 It is "little more than a prohibition of actual
copying."l 2 7 It requires "some minimal degree of creativity," 2 8 but only a
"slight amount" 29 or "a dash"' 3 0 is needed. The "vast majority of works make
the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, 'no matter how
crude, humble or obvious' it might be."13' For photographs, "even [those
having only] the slightest artistic touch will meet the originality test." 3 2
Courts deem photographs to be original based on a photographer's
exercise of discretion in three areas: craft, subject matter, and aesthetics.' 33 The

125

1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[E][1], at 2-129

(Matthew Bender ed., 2012) (footnote omitted); accord Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel
Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that the overwhelming majority of
photographs probably have the modest amount of originality necessary for copyright). Still,
Judge Hand's edict was too far-reaching. Consider, after all, the photographs at issue; they
merely depicted trademarks, in the only way those trademarks could be depicted, without any
embellishment whatsoever, for purposes of transferring the marks to die-cuts for printing. The
Supreme Court has recently commented on the opinion, deeming it a "misunderst[anding]" of the
Copyright Act. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991). In
particular, the Court stated that Jewelers' Circularimproperly endorsed a theory of originality
that would reward sweat-of-the-brow efforts. Id.
126
L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc).
127 Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929); accord
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (quoting HoagueSprague, 31 F.2d at 586).
128 Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345 (citing 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §
2.01[A]-[B] (1990)).
129 id.
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992).
131 Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345 (quoting 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 128, §
1.08[C][1]).
132
Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000).
133 These categories are rough and can bleed into one another. For example, many technical
choices, i.e., choices about craft, such as the choice of a shutter speed, will have an impact on
aesthetics. According to the Second Circuit:
The technical aspects of photography imbue the medium with almost
limitless creative potential. For instance, the selection of a camera format
governs the film size and ultimately the clarity of the negative. Lenses affect
the perspective. Film can produce an array of visual effects. Selection of a
fast shutter speed freezes motion while a slow speed blurs it. Filters alter
130
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first area, craft, has to do with the camera and photographic process.
Photographers exercise discretion with regard to their craft by choosing a
camera, film, lenses, and filters,134 creating or selecting lighting conditions,13 5
adjusting the camera's shutter speed and focus,' 6 employing specific
developing techniques,13 7 and, in recent years, altering various aspects of a
photograph via computer.' 3 8 Discretion in this area would also include such
things as selecting the proper f-stop,13 9 choosing a certain type of photographic
paper or other medium for printing the final image, using techniques like
dodging and burningl 40 (and any of a variety of choices made with an enlarger
or computer during printing), and handwork of the type employed by

pictorialists.141
The second area, subject matter, has to do with representation.
Photographs are, by and large, representative of nature or some invented scene.
And even in the rare case where a photograph is not representative in that way,
color, brightness, focus and reflection. Even the strength of the developing
solution can alter the grain of the negative.
SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). For courts
that go to great lengths to document the originality, individuality, and artistry in photo-making,
see Skyy Spirits, 225 F.3d at 1073-74 (quoting photojournalist W. Eugene Smith and artphotographer Edward Weston describing their processes); L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d
791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The camera operator described herself as 'an artist. I use a paintbrush.
I use the camera to tell a story."').
134
See, e.g., Rogers, 960 F.2d at 307 (staged photograph of couple holding puppies); Tullo,
973 F.2d at 794 (films of news events); Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp.
2d 1197, 1206 (D. Haw. 2006) (candid photograph of hula dancer); SHL Imaging, Inc., 117 F.
Supp. 2d at 310 (photographs of frames); Epic Metals Corp. v. CONDEC, Inc., 867 F. Supp.
1009, 1013 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (photographs of composite floor systems); Time, Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (film of Kennedy assassination).
135
See Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d at 1077 (considering staged photograph of vodka bottle
made for advertising purposes); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304 (discussing decisions about natural
lighting); Reece, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1206; SHL Imaging, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d at 310; Epic
Metals Corp., 867 F. Supp. at 1013; 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 125, § 2.08.
136
See Tullo, 973 F.2d at 794 (discussing "exposure"); SHL Imaging Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d at
310.
'n
See SHL Imaging, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
138 See E. Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1124 (D. Nev.
1999).
139 See Friedman v. Guetta, No. CV 10-00014 DDP (JCx), 2011 WL 3510890, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. May 27, 2011) (discussing depth of field).
140
Dodging is a technique in which the photographer prevents light from reaching a print, to
make certain areas of the print lighter. Burning is a technique in which the photographer allows
more light to reach certain areas of a print, making those areas darker. There are corresponding
techniques for digital photography.
141
See, e.g., Friedman, 2011 WL 3510890 at *3 (mentioning photographer's choice of
"graininess" for final image).
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it still has a subject matter: it is about something. This "aboutness" qualifies the
work as representative.1 42 Photographers exercise discretion with regard to
representation when they select a venue, whether natural or artificial, 14 3 choose
the exact subject matter (focal point) for their work, 1" determine "how best to
tell the story" of their subject,145 requisition the precise moment of
meaningfulness,146 and pose models, elicit expressions, and do all of the things
associated with portraiture that the Burrow-Giles Court highlighted. 4 1
The final area, aesthetics, encompasses all of the considerations that go
into creating some sort of formal arrangement. That formal arrangement will
involve shape, line, texture, movement, massing, chiaroscuro, and the like.148 It
will make an appeal to the senses.149 It will not necessarily be beautiful to every
viewer, but it will allow the viewer to contemplate the work's formal
arrangement. 5 0 Aesthetic considerations include decisions about perspective
142 RICHARD ELDRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION To THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART 79 (2003).
143
See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000) (analyzing
photograph of vodka bottle in artificial setting); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp.
130, 133, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (discussing Abraham Zapruder's film of President Kennedy's
assassination and his choice of the area to be filmed); see also BILL JAY, THE THING ITSELF: THE
(2006),
available
at
PRINCIPLE
OF
PHOTOGRAPHY
FUNDAMENTAL
http://www.billjayonphotography.com/The%2OThing%20Itself.pdf (telling photography students
about the importance of their choice of subject matter).
'"
L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing photographers'
choice of "newsworth[y]" subjects); see also Skyy Spirits Inc., 225 F.3d at 1077; 1 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 125, § 2.08. But see Straus v. DVC Worldwide, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 620,
637 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (stating that "[u]nprotected aspects include the general subject"); I NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 125, § 2.08[E][1] ("[Clopyright in [a] photograph conveys no rights over
the subject matter conveyed in the photograph."). The latter cases stand for the proposition that
copyright protects the photograph itself, not the subject matter of the photograph. In other words,

Mannie Garcia can photograph President Obama, and he can prevent others from improperly
using that photograph, but he cannot prevent others from going to the original source, President
Obama himself, and re-photographing him.
145

Tullo, 973 F.2d at 794.

See Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1206 (D. Haw.
2006); Time, Inc., 293 F. Supp. at 143; 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 125, § 2.08.
146

147
Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d at 1077; Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992);
Epic Metals Corp. v. CONDEC, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1009, 1013 (M.D. Fla. 1994). But see Straus,
484 F. Supp. 2d at 638 ("'[I]n cases involving photographs, a plaintiffs copyrights cannot
monopolize the various poses used, and can protect only [the] plaintiffs particular photographic
expression of these poses and not the underlying ideas therefore."') (quoting Kisch v. Ammirati
& Puris Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
148
See SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(chiaroscuro); see also ROBERT H. GOODSALL, PICTORIAL PHOTOGRAPHY 8 (5th ed. 1945)
(discussing photographic composition).
149
G.W.F. HEGEL, THE INTRODUCTION TO HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF FINE ART 169-70 (Bernard
Bosanquet trans., 1905) (presenting Hegel's terminology about sensory appeals).
Iso
See, ELDRIDGE, supra note 142, at 48, 62-63.
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(the angle of the shot),15' composition, 152 tonality,153 and presumably, numerous
other design principles.
Of course, there is an outer limit to photographic originality, a point
where the photographer has not exercised enough discretion of the type
described to qualify her work as "original." In Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd v.
Corel Corp., the Southern District of New York confronted that limit. There,
the plaintiff created and sold photographic reproductions of famous works of
art. The artworks themselves were in the public domain.154 But the plaintiff
wanted to copyright its reproductions. The defendant argued that the
reproductions lacked sufficient originality to be copyrightable.
The court agreed. It concluded that the plaintiff had done no more than
slavishly copy the original, and that copyright was not, therefore, available:
In this case, [the] plaintiff by its own admission has labored to
create "slavish copies" of public domain works of art. While it
may be assumed that this required both skill and effort, there
was no spark of originality-indeed, the point of the exercise
was to reproduce the underlying works with absolute fidelity.
Copyright is not available in these circumstances.15 s
Extending copyright to such works would "'put a weapon for harassment in the
copiers intent on appropriating and monopolizing public
hands of mischievous
1 56

domain work."'

In Bridgeman, the defendant only made choices about craft, e.g., the
choice of camera and lens. It did not make choices about representation and
aesthetics; the existing, public-domain works dictated those choices.
Bridgeman thus makes clear that craft-related choices are not, alone, enough. 57
A photographer must also make choices about representation or aesthetics, or

151 Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d at 1077; L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.
1992); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 307; Reece, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1206; Epic Metals, 867 F. Supp. at
1013; 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 125, § 2.08; see also Time, Inc., 293 F. Supp. at 133
(discussing Zapruder's meticulous choice of a place to set up his camera for the best view of the
presidential caravan).
152
E. Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(considering "lay-out").
153
SHL Imaging, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (discussing "brightness").
154
Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

Id
Id. at 196 (quoting L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976) (en
banc)).
'
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (using
Bridgeman to conclude that "[d]ecisions about film, camera, and lens ... often bear on whether
an image is original. But the fact that a photographer made such choices does not alone make the
image original.").
55

156
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his craft-related choices must impact the final product in some discernible way,
perhaps by producingsome representational or aesthetic effects.
IV. PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE FACT-EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY: PICTORIALISM'S
LINGERING LEGACY

Pictorialism does not, anymore, infect courts' assessments of
photographic originality. It does, however, spill over into another area of
copyright law, the fact-expression (or idea-expression) dichotomy.' And this
poses a problem: it is nearly a century after the shift to straight photography.
Today, the art world not only accepts straight photography as a legitimate
aesthetic vis-i-vis pictorialism, it arguably recognizes it as the superior
aesthetic. 5 9 The copyright laws do not, however, reflect this attitudinal change.
This Part therefore connects the historical background presented in the
two previous Parts-about the American public's reluctance to accept
photography as an art form and about the copyright laws' struggle with
accommodating photography as an expressive medium-to the fact-expression
dichotomy and its two offspring, the substantial-similarity test and the natureof-the-original prong of the fair use doctrine. First, it gives the reader an
overview of the fact-expression dichotomy. Second, it gives the reader an
overview of the substantial-similarity test and the fair use defense. Finally, it
demonstrates the ways in which these tests, doctrines, and defenses shortchange
straight photographs.
A.

An Overview of the Fact-ExpressionDichotomy

Congress designed the Copyright Act to secure a public benefit, as
directed by the Constitution: to encourage invention and creativity. The Act
thus delicately balances competing interests. It rewards and encourages
authorship by giving authors a monopoly in their works. But it also limits that
monopoly for fear that protecting authors' interests too vigorously would
undermine the very public benefit the Act seeks to promote. After all, authors
build on those who go before them. As Sir Isaac Newton famously put it, "If I
have seen further it is by standing on ye sholders [sic] of giants." 6 0

Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
159
For example, the Old Glory photograph of soldiers raising the American flag at Iwo Jima
captivated the nation with its stunning composition as well as the story it told. There is a
controversy, though, over whether the photograph was staged, and many people would hold the
photograph in lower regard if that were the case. See Joe Rosenthal, Old Glory Goes Up on Mt.
Suribachi,Iwo Jima (1945) (gelatin silver print), available at http://www.mfah.org/art/detail/oldglory-goes-mt-suribachi-iwo-jima.
i5

160

ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT 9 (1965).

Newton was not the first, or only, person to make the statement, but he did make it quite
famously. See id.
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The fact-expression dichotomy makes the giants' shoulders available to
secondary users like Newton. Facts cannot be copyrighted; expression can be.
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act makes this proposition explicit: "In no
case does copyright protection ... extend to any idea, procedure, process,
,,161
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery ....
According to the Supreme Court, this is "[t]he most fundamental axiom of
copyright law."1 6 2
That axiom stems inevitably from the Constitution's originality
requirement. Facts are simply not original. "This is because facts do not owe
their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between creation and
discovery: The first person to find and report a particular fact has not created
the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence."' 63 Facts "are part of the
public domain available to every person."'" And they must be so if the
Constitution's mandates, to promote the progress of science and the arts, and to
facilitate free speech, are taken seriously.
What, then, does copyright protect? Authors must, to give facts
meaning, express them somehow-in words or by some other objective
manifestation. Copyright protection extends to that expression, i.e., to the
selection, coordination, and arrangement of facts.165 For literature, it extends to
the crafting of the language. If an author "clothes facts with an original
collocation of words,"l 6 6 she can claim a copyright in those words. Secondary
users can copy her facts, but not her "word-for-word" presentation of facts.
Moreover, they cannot even closely paraphrase her; as Judge Learned Hand put
it, copyright "cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would
escape [punishment] by [making] immaterial variations."l 68 Plagiarism is not,
in other words, fair use.
For example, Diana K. Sugg's Pulitzer Prize winning newspaper
article, New Hope for Halting a Killer Illness, has beautiful, poignant
language.169 The first paragraph reads:

162

17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
Feist Publ'ns,Inc., 499 U.S. at 344-45.

163

Id. at 347.

'6

165

Id. at 348.
Id. at 357, 360.

166

Id. at 348.

Harper & Row Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1985); see I
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 125, § 2.11.
168
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); accord Melville B.
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the FirstAmendment Guaranteesof Free Speech and Press?,
17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1189 (1970).
169
Diana K. Sugg, New Hope for Halting a Killer Illness, BALT. SUN, June 2, 2002,
at lA,
availableat http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-sugg06O2,0,7049077.story.
167
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She thought it was just a cold. Her throat was sore, and she felt
tired all over. But as JoAnn Barr got her son ready for school
that morning in March, she started gasping for breath. Within a
few hours, Barr was on a ventilator in intensive care, her blood
pressure bottoming out, her kidneys failing.170
But one can easily extract the facts from the expression: on a March
morning, JoAnn Barr (1) thought she had a cold; (2) had a sore throat and
fatigue; (3) was getting her son ready for school when she experienced severe
respiratory problems; (4) was in a hospital's intensive-care unit, at most, three
hours later; (5) needed a ventilator; (6) had dangerously low blood pressure;
and (7) was experiencing kidney failure.
The expression resides in Sugg's exact phraseology, e.g., "she felt tired
all over." It resides in her use of short, tension-building sentences: "She thought
it was just a cold." It resides in her unusual use of the word "But" at the front of
a sentence to signify a change of tone (Barr thought she had a cold. But it was
really a life-threatening medical emergency). It resides in her provocative and
unexpected word choices, like "gasping" and "bottoming out." It resides in her
sequencing, the way she tells the story from getting ready for an ordinary
school day to winding up in the hospital with kidney failure. And it resides in
her use of rhetoric, particularly asyndeton, where she omits the conjunctive
"and," keeping readers speeding through the text: she was "in intensive care,
her blood pressure bottoming out, her kidneys failing."
Other journalists can cover Barr's story. And they can use Sugg's
article to do so, even if Sugg objects. They can take the article's facts without
independently verifying them (so far as their own journalistic standards
permit). But they cannot take Sugg's expression. Copyright protects her
phraseology, sentence structure, transitions, word choices, sequencing,
17
punctuation, and the like. '
The Fact-ExpressionDichotomy, Substantial Similarity, and Fair Use

B.

The fact-expression dichotomy is, as mentioned above, a sub-species of
the Constitution's originality requirement. In practice, however, it appears most
often in the context of substantial similarity and fair use.

170

Id.

See Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc'd Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918); Wainwright Sec., Inc. v.
Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television
Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976); Chi. Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass'n, 275 F. 797,
798-99 (7th Cir. 1921).
171
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the fact-expression dichotomy and substantial similarity

A plaintiff litigating a copyright-infringement case must prove two
elements: ownership of a valid copyright and copying by the defendant.17 2 The
plaintiff can establish the latter element, copying, via either an admission by the
defendant or proof of substantial similarity between the plaintiffs and
defendant's works.17 3 The substantial-similarity inquiry must, however, be
tailored appropriately. Fact-finders can only compare the copyrightable
elements in the respective works. Thus, the fact-expression dichotomy comes
into play: the defendant's work must substantially resemble the plaintiffs
expression. If it merely duplicates her ideas, or borrows her facts, there is no
infringement. In the case of a newspaper article, like Sugg's article, above, the
fact-expression dichotomy may apply in a fairly straightforward way. But the
exercise is often less straightforward for fictional works. Where, for such
works, does the boundary between fact and expression lie?
a.

the abstractions test

According to Judge Learned Hand, ruling on a case involving a play,
"[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can."l 74 He
nevertheless applied a test, now known as the "abstractions test," to roughly
delineate a boundary:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more
and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no
more than the most general statement of what the play is about,
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point
in this series of abstractions where they are no longer
protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use

172

See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 125,

§ 13.01.
Some commentators prefer the term "probative similarity" to "substantial similarity." They
view the element of copying to have two components, factual copying and actionable copying. A
plaintiff may prove factual copying even though there is no substantial similarity between her
work and the defendant's work. However, to show that the copying amounts to infringement, she
must show substantial similarity. Stated differently, copying does not, in and of itself, indicate
infringement. In order to be infringing, the copying must be substantial. See id. § 13.03.
1' Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121; see also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d
487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) ("Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone
beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore
inevitably be ad hoc."); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 125, § 19E.04[B[I1], at 19E-35 ("There
is an inherent difficulty separating an idea from its expression.").
173

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss1/11

30

Bruce: In the Language of Pictures: How Copyright Law Fails to Adequatel

IN THE LANGUA GE OF PICTURES

2012]1

123

of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his
property is never extended.17 s
Take Tennessee Williams' A Streetcar Named Desire. Could another

playwright produce a play about a southern belle who loses the family
plantation? The answer is most certainly "yes." The idea, abstracted so
generally, is not protectable. However, if this secondary author includes enough
detail from the original play-the school that employed the southern belle fired
her for having an affair with a student; the southern belle is forced to live in
New Orleans with her sister and brother-in-law; the southern belle is obsessed
with male attention and lives in a world that is part fantasy and part reality; the
brother-in-law is a rough, cruel man who eventually rapes the southern belle;
and the southern belle has a nervous breakdown and is committed to a mental
institution-then she will have crossed the line from fact to expression,
infringing the original author's copyright.
Thus, the idea of a watch depicting a cat and mouse, with the mouse as
the second hand, circling the cat, is unprotectable.176 Other watchmakers can
produce cat-and-mouse watches without the original watchmaker's permission.
But they cannot copy the first watchmaker's expression. They cannot, for
instance, use a seated Tabby cat facing left along with a stylized version of a
mouse.' 77 Similarly, the idea of a businessman on the verge of jumping from a
city building is unprotectable.178 Other artists can copy that idea. But they
cannot copy its execution: they cannot copy the original artist's use of a
horizontal, panoramic perspective, a metallic ledge, a view of converging
streets filled with taxicabs, and a diagonal shadow that directs the viewer's eye
to the model's shoes.179
b.

stock scenes and merger

Sometimes, even with the abstractions (and other) tests, courts just
cannot separate idea from expression. This is where the scenes A faire and
merger doctrines come into play. The scenes A faire doctrine recognizes that
copyright cannot protect expression that amounts to a stock scene flowing

Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. Some courts use other tests, not the abstractions test, to judge
substantial similarity. See, e.g., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110
(9th Cir. 1970) (discussing the "total concept and feel" test); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
125, § 13.03 (discussing the patterns test and other alternatives to the abstractions test).
76 Direct Mktg. of Va., Inc. v. E. Mishan & Sons, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 100, 104 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
17s

177

Id.
178 Kaplan v. Stock Mkt. Photo Agency, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 317, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
1"

See id. at 326-27.
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necessarily from the chosen storyline or setting.' 80 "In two works dramatizing
the trial of Judas Iscariot, for example, it was only natural to feature Satan as a
character, dressed formally, ridiculing the examining lawyer."' 8 '
The merger doctrine is similar. It recognizes that some ideas are
"inseparably tied to a particular expression."' 82 In other words, idea and
expression merge. When that occurs, copyright cannot protect the expression
lest it confer a monopoly on the underlying idea. "The merger doctrine operates
as an exception to the normal idea-expression dichotomy. The doctrine holds
that, when there are so few ways of expressing an idea, not even the expression
is protected by copyright." 8 3
For example, in a case involving a candy-cane-shaped die used to
stamp shapes out of construction paper and other materials, the court held that
the design was not copyrightable. In the court's words, "[t]here are extremely
limited ways in which to depict a candy cane and still be able to express the
idea. Therefore, an attempt to copyright the expression of a candy cane is
essentially an attempt to copyright the idea." 84 This makes sense. Candy canes
are always striped and hook-shaped. The best way to depict them is in profile,
facing either left or right. There may be variations, in girth, length, color,
stripe-style, and perspective, but they are limited. Thus, the candy cane
example is a relatively easy case of merger.
2.

the fact-expression dichotomy and fair use

The fair use defense, set forth in Section 107 of the Copyright Act,
limits an original author's monopoly in her copyrighted work. It "permits
courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster."' 85 It
represents "a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to use the

180

Straus v. DVC Worldwide, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 620, 637 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 125,

1814
182

§ 13.03[B][4], at 13-88.8 (footnote omitted).

id

BUC Int'l Corp. v. Int'l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129, 1143 (11th Cir. 2007).
Ellison Educ. Equip., Inc. v. Tekservices, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1350, 1360 (D. Neb. 1995);
see also Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating, in case involving
plush toys shaped like dinosaurs, that the copyright holder could "place no reliance upon any
similarity in expression resulting from either the physiognomy of dinosaurs or from the nature of
stuffed animals"); Psihoyos v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 268, 277-78 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (holding that there were limited ways of illustrating fossil of fighting dinosaurs because
fossil dictated creatures' physiology and stance).
185 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa
State Univ. Research Found.,
Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
t8

184
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copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent." 8 6 Courts
have called the fair use doctrine "the most troublesome" in the whole of
copyright law.187
The second fair use factor, "the nature of the copyrighted work," is one
of the doctrine's more mysterious components. Legislative history and case law
do not shed much light on it; the factor is "superficially discussed and little
understood." 88 That said, courts assess the factor by considering, among other
things, whether an original work is creative or factual. Creative works are
"closer to the core of intended copyright protection."l 89 They are "fictional,"
"fanciful," and "fantas[tical],"' 9 0 things like Michaelangelo's David or P.I.
Tchaikovsky's Swan Lake. Courts diligently safeguard such works; people who
copy them have a hard time establishing fair use.191 Factual works, like
telephone books, catalogs, and biographies, are a different matter. They are not
core works.' 92 And they are more susceptible to fair use claims. 9 3
In short, the second fair use factor involves an inquiry into creativity.
This inquiry is very similar to the one in Burrow-Giles, where the Court had to
determine whether photographs contain the minimal originality necessary to
support a copyright in the first place. However, there is one significant
difference. The creativity needed for a favorable second-factor ruling is higher
than that needed for a work to be deemed original and copyrightable:
"Creativity for the purposes of fair use is harder to establish than threshold
copyrightability."194 Accordingly, courts are more likely to find a work factual
under the second fair use factor than they are to find a work unoriginal at an
earlier stage of litigation.

Harper & Row Publ'ers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting H.
BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
187
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
186

188
189
190

Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105,1116 (1990).
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
Id

19

Id
Id.; Harper & Row Publ'ers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985).
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).

194

Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 188 (D. Mass. 2007),

191

192
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The Fact-ExpressionDichotomy as Applied to StraightPhotographic
Works

The fact-expression dichotomy-whether part of a copyrightability,
substantial-similarity, or fair use analysis-is difficult to apply.195 It is tricky to
broadly categorize certain individual works as either "creative" or "factual."
Most works are some combination of the two, and calculating the relative
proportion of one to the other is an inexact science. It requires going deeper
than mere labels. A fictional romance may seem to be a core creative work, but,
as a leading treatise puts it, "[s]ome factual works (e.g., computer programs and
test questions) contain more inventiveness than some fictional works (e.g.,
formula romances)." 96
1.

identifying the facts in a straight photograph

Part of the problem is that Congress wrote the Copyright Act with
literature in mind. Courts are thus exporting rules designed for literature to
other media. And the rules may need to bend accordingly:
[T]he same general principles are applied in claims involving
plays, novels, sculpture, maps, directories of information,
musical compositions, as well as artistic paintings. Isolating the
idea from the expression and determining the extent of copying
required for unlawful appropriation necessarily depend to some
degree on whether the subject matter is words or symbols
written on paper, or paint brushed onto canvas.' 97
According to Second Circuit Judge Jon 0. Newman, the problem "is
not just a matter of vocabulary. Words convey concepts, and if we use identical
phrases from one context to resolve issues in another, we risk failing to notice
that the relevant concepts are and ought to be somewhat different."' 9 8 In other

19'
E.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001);
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'1 Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978); Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
196
4 PATRY, supra note 84, § 10:138 (footnotes omitted).

197 Franklin Mint Corp., 575 F.2d at 65; see also Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720
F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983) (acknowledging "tension" from application of rules formulated for
literary works to graphic and three-dimensional art); Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F.
Supp. 2d 444, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The idealexpression distinction arose in the context of
literary copyright" but "[i]n the visual arts, the distinction breaks down."); Robert A. Gorman,
Fact or Fancy? The Implicationsfor Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 560, 562 (1982) ("in
many fact works the literary or artistic expression is dictated by and inseparable from the
underlying information").
198 Jon 0. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in the
ComputerAge, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691, 697 (1999).
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words, the problem is not just in drawing lines between facts and expression.
Courts routinely engage in line-drawing. The problem "is that the line itself is
meaningless because the conceptual categories it purports to delineate are illsuited to the subject matter." 99
Photographs are a case in point. For photographic works, especially
straight photographs, the problem of untangling facts and expression is
particularly thorny. The "line between idea and expression ... is often blurry
and difficult to identify in the context of a photograph."200 One court has even
declared that, "[i]n the context of photography, the idea/expression distinction
is not useful or relevant." 20 1
a.

straight photography seamlessly blends facts and
expression

One of the problems is that photographs, particularly straight ones,
seamlessly blend facts and expression. 2 0 2 In the example above, involving
Diana K. Sugg's article, New Hope for Halting a Killer Illness,20 3 the factexpression dichotomy was relatively easy to apply. I was able to simply pluck
the facts out of the expression. I could even make a list of facts, and describe
the remaining expression in fairly concrete terms.
But try that same exercise with a photograph, say Alfred Eisenstaedt's
famous photograph of an American sailor kissing a nurse in Times Square on
V-J day.204 If we try to pluck the facts out of the expression, we may start with
the following list: (1) a man is kissing a woman; (2) the man is wearing a
sailor's uniform; (3) the woman is wearing a nurse's uniform; (4) the man is
bending over the woman, who is leaning back; (5) the woman is kicking her
right calf up; (6) the man is in back of the woman; (7) the man is facing the
photograph's right and the woman is facing the photograph's left; and (8) the
One Times Square building is in the background just behind the man's right
shoulder.
The list looks pretty good, but now try to describe the remaining
expression. What is left over? Or, to take a different tack, what would a list of
the photograph's expression look like? I submit that it would look a lot like the

19
Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 458 (discussing the fact-expression dichotomy and
photography).
200
Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1205 (D. Haw. 2006).
201
Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 461.
202
E.g., Nimmer, supra note 168, at 1197 ("[L]ittle is contributed by the idea divorced from

its expression.").
203
See supraPart IV.A.
204
Alfred
Eisenstaedt,

The
Kiss
(1945)
(photograph),
available
at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Legendarykiss_V%E2%80%93J-dayinTimesSquare_Alfre
dEisenstaedt.jpg.
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list we just created: a sailor kissing a nurse, bending her over backwards, her
leg in that classic kiss-me pose, him in back facing right and her in front facing
left, with the most-identifiable corner in Times Square visible in the
background.
The problem is that the language of literature is different from the
language of photographs, and the fact-expression dichotomy is geared towards
the former. Literature uses an abstract language, composed of symbols, which
make up words. Some of those words represent facts, which are not
copyrightable, and some of them represent expressions, which are. Each word
is separate from the next, so excising a word, or combination of words, that
represents a fact is relatively straightforward.
Photographs, in contrast, use a concrete, visual language. That
language is not composed of abstract symbols like the characters in an
alphabet. It does not use words, which are individual and self-contained, each
one distinct from its counterparts. Rather, it is composed of facts in the world,
and those facts are stitched together so tightly into an expressive whole that the
idea of removing a single fact from the tableaux is absurd. Visual facts, unlike
words, do not sometimes amount to facts and sometimes to expression (the
statement itself is nonsensical). They are facts, plain and simple. And viewers
perceive them all at once. This differs from an article or a book, "from which
pertinent sections may be culled." 2 05
b.

the fact-expression dichotomy causes confusion over a
fact and its depiction

Another problem with the fact-expression dichotomy, as applied to
photographs, is that it engenders confusion over the role of subject matter.
Photographs are almost always representational. They depict some object or
scene. They have subject matter. Is that subject matter copyrightable? It
depends. If the photograph is pictorial, like a staged portrait with an artificial
background, the answer is probably "yes."
In Gross v. Seligman,2 06 for instance, a photographer staged an
allegorical ?hotograph, Grace of Youth, featuring a young nude with a "sedate"
expression. 7 He then sold the copyright to another party.208 Later, however, he
re-staged the original, posing the same model in the same position. He called
the second photograph "Cherry Ripe."209 It duplicated the original, except that
the model was two years older, smiling, and had a cherry stem between her
Willajeanne F. McLean, All's Not Fair in Art and War: A Look at the Fair Use Defense
After Rogers v. Koons, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 373, 412 (1993).
206
212 F. 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1914).
205

207

id

208

Id

209

Id at 930.
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teeth. 210 The court held that the photographer had infringed the copyright on the
original photograph.211
Today, a court would likely characterize Cherry Ripe as a permissible
parody of Grace of Youth, but the basic principle-that re-staging a
copyrighted photograph infringes that photograph-is still good law.212 And,
with some caveats, it probably applies with equal force to pictorial and straight
photographs. Suppose, for example, that I take a candid photograph of Maya
Angelou. I cannot prevent others from later re-photographing (or painting or
drawing or otherwise representing) her.213 On the other hand, I can prevent
them from actually copying my photograph. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
put it, "[t]he opposite proposition would mean that a portrait by Velasquez or
Whistler was common property because others might try their hand on the same
face. Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the
copy."214
Confusion arises, however, with straight photographs, because their
subject matter is factual, and facts, of course, cannot be copyrighted. People
seem to have a hard time distinguishing between the fact and the depiction of
the fact. The former is not copyrightable. The latter is. Take, for example,
Shepard Fairey's Obama Hope bumpersticker. 215 Fairey admittedly based it on
a copyrighted photograph.2 16 And he copied that photograph wholesale,
duplicating its composition exactly.2 17 The only changes he made were
heightening the contrast, changing the skin tones to red-white-and-blue,
removing an already-sparse background, and adding a lapel pin where, before,
there was none. Fairey's work did not comment on the original, so it would
seem to violate the rule against "copy[ing] the copy."21 8 Nevertheless,
numerous commentators took Fairey's side.2 19

210

id

211
212

Id. at 931-32.
See, e.g., 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 125,

§ 2.08[E][2].
See, e.g., Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
214
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903).
215
See David Kravets, AP Blasts Obama "Hope" Artist in Copyright Flap, WIRED (Mar.
11,
2009, 12:17 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/03/ap-blasts-obama (providing a sideby-side comparison of Manny Garcia's original photograph and Shepard Fairey's secondary
artwork).
216
See id.
217
See id.
218
This language is from Justice Holmes's opinion in Bleistein. 377 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
219 E.g., Edward L. Carter, Copyright Ownership of Online News: Cultivating a
Transformation Ethos in America's EmergingStatutory Attribution Right, 16 CoMM. L. & POL'Y
161, 191 (2011); Alison C. Gaughenbaugh, Is There Hope? Incorporatingthe FirstAmendment
into a Fair Use Analysis, 36 U. DAYTON L. REv. 87, 113 (2010); Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting
Originality, 31 CARDozo L. REV. 451, 456 (2009); Hiro Senda, Hope or Nope-Is "Obama
213
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The better view, though, is that the original photograph was, like any
other photograph, expressive in terms of such things as composition. Anyone
can freely photograph President Obama because he is, in the context of this
discussion, a fact in the world. But President Obama's likeness, frozen
photographically in a certain attitude, is not a fact.2 20 A photograph is not
President Obama. It is a depiction of President Obama. The judge in the Fairey
case recognized as much, telling the parties that "sooner or later, [the
plaintiff] ... is going to win." 22 1
Still, the Fairey case demonstrates that people struggle with the factexpression dichotomy in the context of straight photographs. Such photographs
are, by nature, appropriative of visual facts. People confuse those facts with the
photographer's expression of them.
2.

the fact-expression dichotomy pits pictorial photographs
against straight ones

The fact-expression dichotomy is also problematic in that it pits
pictorial photographs against straight ones: Pictorial photographs, which
222
repudiate the camera's natural tendency toward realism, are creative.
Consequently, straight photographs, which embrace realism, are not.
Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 22 3 illustrates the courts' typical
response to pictorial photographs. The case involved two highly-manipulated,
surrealistic photographs. The first, Cracking Eggs,224 depicted a broken egg
with eyeballs instead of white and yolk. The second, The Feast,225 depicted a
Hope" Protected by Idea/Expression Dichotomy, Fair Use Doctrine, & FirstAmendment?, 10
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 65, 101 (2010); Rachael L. Shinoskie, In Defense of Fairey and Fair
Use, 28 ENT. & SPORTS L. 16, 20 (Spring 2010).
220
See Friedman v. Guetta, No. 10-00014 DDP (JCx), 2011 WL 3510890, at *5 (C.D. Cal.
May 27, 2011) ("Our language is rich with words that attempt to communicate the many feelings
and thoughts that make us human. We also use facial expressions, actions, and body language to
convey meaning. A particular countenance might express happiness, interest, boredom, fear, or
some combination of the almost limitless expressions that make up our unspoken language.... A
photograph of a person captures a person's expression in a particular instant of time, and will
almost always possess the requisite level of creativity to warrant protection.").
221
Dave Itzkoff, Judge Urges Resolution in Use of Obama Photo, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2010,
at C2, available at 2010 WLNR 11057700.
222
The term "expressive" is more appropriate for the originality question, where the factexpression dichotomy is at the forefront. The term "creative" is more appropriate for the fair use
question, where the second fair use factor is at the forefront. However, this Article will use the
terms interchangeably.
223
626 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1986).
224
Jim
Haberman,
Cracking Eggs
(2011)
(photograph),
available
at
http://www.jimhaberman.com/Site%202/Silver/ 20Fantasy%202.html.
225
Jim
Haberman,
The
Feast
(2011)
(photograph),
available
at
http://www.jimhaberman.com/Site%202/American%20Scenes.html.
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family of wormlike creatures, with no facial features save for enormous
mouths, seated at a table for Thanksgiving dinner. The plaintiff won on the
second fair use factor ("the nature of the copyrighted work"): the court
described the photographs as "fine art photographs of a surrealistic character"
and "works of fantasy."22 6 It noted that they evidenced "pronounced
creativity."22 7 Hence, it deemed them "creative, imaginative, and original."228
The defendant had used the photographs fairly, to comment on the
originals in a humorous, newsy way. Thus, the court resolved the case
correctly; it also resolved the second fair use factor correctly; pictorial
photographs do deserve stringent protection. But its rationale was rooted firmly
in a turn-of-the-century attitude. That attitude incorrectly bifurcates pictorial
and straight photographs.
This bifurcation is apparent in Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Lloyd E.
Rigler-Lawrence E. Deutsch Foundation.229 The case involved a movie,
CarnegieHall, that tells the fictional story of a mother who works as a janitor
at Carnegie Hall, and her son, who becomes a talented musician who performs
at that venue. 2 30 The movie includes live musical performances by well-known
classical artists, but those performances are staged.
The defendant argued that the performances were factual because they
featured real artists really performing. The court disagreed, holding that the
performances were not factual because of the directorial choices involved in the
staging. 2 3 1 This implies that, if the directors had used clips from un-staged
performances, the court would have deemed them factual-even though,
presumably, there would be no discernible difference between staged
performances, made to look real for a movie, and real performances, candidly
filmed. The court's stated rationale therefore leads to an inconsistent result. The
idea that photographic works are creative only insofar as they are unrealistic is,
simply, flawed.
It not only fails to account in a sensible way for copyright's protection
of pictorial photographs; it does an outright disservice to straight photographs.
For example, in Mathieson v. AssociatedPress,2 32 the court held that the second
fair use factor favored the defendant. The case involved a photograph of Oliver

Id. at 211. Cf Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir.
2003) ("[P]hotographs taken for aesthetic purposes . . . are creative ... and ... fit squarely within
the core of copyright protection.").
227
Haberman, 626 F. Supp. at 211.
228
id
229
Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Lloyd E. Rigler-Lawrence E. Deutsch Found., No. 04
CIV.5332(NRB), 2005 WL 2875327, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2005).
226

230

Id. at *2.

231

Id

232

No. 90 CIV 6945 (LMM), 1992 WL 164447 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1992).
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North, which had appeared on the cover of a brochure for "body armor." 233 The
Associated Press used the photograph, without permission, in a newspaper
article about North's business activities. North's involvement in a company that
sold bullet-proof vests was newsworthy due to his role in the Iran-Contra
scandal. The court concluded that the Associated Press's use was fair and the
photograph "complemented the text of the news story in a usual and customary
way.
The case was, like Haberman, correctly decided. But the court's
analysis of the second fair use factor is interesting. The court held that the
photograph was factual, noting that it was "considerably less 'imaginative' or
'creative' than it might have been had [the] plaintiff employed more dramatic
artistic effects."23 5 And it cited to Haberman. This phraseology, "dramatic
artistic effects," combined with a reference to the surrealistic photographs in
Haberman, suggests that the photograph at issue would have fared better if it
had been artificially manipulated and less true to the photographic medium.
The court's rationale, in other words, was decidedly pictorialist.
Nunez v. Caribbean InternationalNews Corp.23 6 suffers from similar
flaws. The case involved photographs of Joyce Giraud, who was Miss Puerto
Rico Universe in 1997. A professional photographer photographed Giraud for
her modeling portfolio. At least one of the photographs depicted her nude or
nearly nude. Consequently, a controversy arose about the photographs'
appropriateness given Giraud's title.
A newspaper published several of the photographs, without permission,
in the context of news articles about the controversy. * That use was clearly
fair commentary on the originals, but the court's resolution of the second fair
use factor is telling. The court stated that the photographs "could be categorized
as either factual or creative.",2 38 And it deemed the second fair use factor
"neutral."2 39 It explained that "the photographs were not artistic representations
designed primarily to express [the photographer's] ... ideas, emotions, or
feelings, but instead a publicity attempt to highlight Giraud's abilities as a

potential model." 24 0
It cited Haberman as a positive analogy, noting that "surrealistic art"
was creative. Once again, the court decided the overall case correctly, but it
probably got the second fair use factor (and the general rationale) wrong. The

233

Idat*1.

234

Id at *3.
Id at *7 (emphasis added).
235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000).

235
236
237

238
239
240

Id. at 21.
Id at 23.
id
id
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idea that a portrait lacks creativity, even though the photographer posed the
model, elicited expressions, and staged the background, contravenes the ageold rules announced in Burrow-Giles and applied over and over again in
subsequent cases. In fact, Nunez seems to take the pictorialist ethic to extremes.
Pictorialism traditionally encompassed portraiture as well as hand-altered
photographs. But Nunez completely disregards the former, suggesting not only
that straight photographs lack creativity, but that portraiture does, as well. It
implies that hand-worked photographs are the only creative photographs.
All of that said, courts by and large resolve cases correctly, and they
even often resolve originality and fair use questions correctly. But, just as
often, their rationales are shaky. As the Ninth Circuit has observed, "the
classification the court selects [fact or expression] may simply state the result
reached rather than the reason for it." 2 4 1 And reasons matter. The law depends
on sound rationales for its force. Without them, the law appears arbitrary and
unprincipled. Right outcomes do not make up for wrong rationales. Those
rationales seep into future cases and undermine the law's stability.24 2
3.

the fact-expression dichotomy does not accommodate works
that are both factual and expressive

Yet another problem with the fact-expression dichotomy is that it fails
to accommodate works that are both factual and expressive. A work can be
factual or creative but not, strictly speaking, both.243 This presents a quandary
for courts confronting claims involving straight photographic works. Again, the
problem is not so much that the courts are deciding cases wrongly, although
they frequently mishandle the second fair use factor. The problem is that their
rationales are unconvincing.
This problem is most apparent in cases involving news footage. The
courts' rationales, invariably, are that news footage is not creative. But courts
can only reach that conclusion by discounting the very same decisions about
craft, representation, and aesthetics that, in a different context, would support a
finding of creativity.

241

242

Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
According to Judge Pierre N. Leval:

Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. Earlier decisions
provide little basis for predicting later ones. Reversals and divided courts are
commonplace. The opinions reflect widely differing notions of the meaning
of fair use. Decisions are not governed by consistent principles, but seem
rather to result from intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns.
Leval, supra note 188, at 1106-07 (footnotes omitted).
243
But see 2 PATRY, supra note 84, § 4:36 (stating that the dichotomy should actually be a
continuum).
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4
Take, for example, Fitzgerald v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. 24 The case
involved candid, outdoor photographs of a well-known mobster shortly after
his arrest. 24 5 The photographer, a professional photojournalist, made choices
about composition, timing, lighting, and location. Courts routinely view such
choices as creative ones. The Fitzgeraldcourt, however, did not. It concluded
that the photographer had "exercised no more than the minimum authorial
decision-making necessary to make a work copyrightable." 2 4 6 In the court's
view, this decision-making "was not a creative process." 247
Similarly, in Fuentes v. Mega Media Holdings, Inc., 248 the court held
that news-oriented video footage was factual. The footage depicted various
members of the Cuban military elite in Angola during the Angolan civil war.249
The videographer, a professional journalist, made choices about subject matter,
composition, framing, perspective, timing, lighting, and so forth 2 50-the types
of decisions that ordinarily result in findings of creativity. But the Fuentes
court disregarded them.
It concluded, like the Fitzgerald court did, that the videographer had
exercised only enough authorial control to make the video copyrightable. 25 1 It
explained that "a reasonable fact-finder could clearly see that there is little to
no 'expressive content' of the work; there is only what seemingly amounts to

[the videographer's] . . . decision to turn the camera on or turn the camera off.
These are 'home videos,' and the [videographer] . . . has referred to them as

such." 2 52 It viewed the videographer's statement that he recorded "everything
[he] found interesting"253 as damaging, disregarding the traditional view that a
photographer's choices about representation-about the elusive moment of
meaningfulness-are creative.
A leading commentator sums up the prevailing view about journalism
and creativity: "[n]ewspapers, talk show material, and television news reporting
broadcasts should be subject to liberal appropriation since they typically
contain little expression."254 That idea-that news reports are unexpressive-is

244
245
246

491 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2007).
Id. at 180.

Id. at 188.

Id The plaintiff ultimately prevailed, on partial summary judgment, on his claim of
copyright infringement, but he lost on the second fair use factor. Id at 179.
248
No. 09-22979-CIV, 2011 WL 2601356 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2011).
249
Id at *1-*2.
250
See id. at *14.
247

251

Id

252
253

Id. at *15.
Id. at *14.

254

4 PATRY, supra note 84,

§ 10:138 (2009) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). But see

Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Photographs that are meant to be
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like a sound bite. When repeated over and over, it somehow becomes the truth.
If, however, one stops to reflect on the sound bite, it is at best an overstatement
and at worst a fallacy.
Some scholars would call the copyrights in factual works "thin." 25 5
They would argue that there is not much expressive material left over once the
facts are subtracted from the work as a whole. 256 But the excerpt above, New
Hope for Halting a Killer Illness,257 shows that news stories can, and do,
display substantial creativity. They are a mixture of facts and expression. They
deserve protection from exact and close copying just like any other copyrighted
work.
I am not denying that news photography is factual. I am merely saying
that it is also expressive, 258 and that the fact-expression dichotomy presents
courts with a false choice: a work can be factual or expressive, but not both. I
am also taking issue with the metaphor of a "thin" copyright and its embedded
assumption that the proportion of copyrightable material in factual works is
trivial. 2 59 The metaphor of a "porous" copyright--one that gives way to facts
but holds fast with regard to expression-the relative proportions of which are
not predetermined, would be more apt.260

viewed by the public for informative and aesthetic purposes . . . are generally creative in nature.")
(emphasis added).
255
See, e.g., 1 NiMMER & NiMMER, supra note 125, § 2.11.
256
Schiffer Publ'g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. CIV.A. 03-4962, 2004 WL 2583817,
at *9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2004).
257
Sugg, supra note 170.
258
Accord Monster Commc'ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490, 494
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Anyone who has seen any of the great pieces of photojournalism-for
example, Alfred Eisenstadt's classic image of a thrilled sailor exuberantly kissing a woman in
Times Square on V-J Day and the stirring photograph of U.S. Marines raising the American flag
atop Mount Surabachi on Iwo Jima-or, perhaps in some eyes, more artistic, but nevertheless
representational, photography-such as Ansel Adams' work and the portraits of Yousuf Karshmust acknowledge that photographic images of actual people, places and events may be as
creative and deserving of protection as purely fanciful creations.") (footnote omitted); see also
Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2000) (presenting an in-depth
discussion of the creative elements of photojournalism and other genres of straight photography).
259
Accord Morgan M. Stoddard, Mother Nature As Muse: Copyright Protectionfor Works of
Art and Photographs Inspired by, Based on, or Depicting Nature, 86 N.C. L. REv. 572, 611-12
(2008) (criticizing the idea of a "thin" copyright for certain works of visual art).
260
Cf Gorman, supra note 197, at 593. Professor Gorman argues that
there should be yet greater protection of expression in works of fact than in
works of fancy; the author of a fact work must cling to expression-protection
as his [or her] only incentive to produce, because the underlying facts are in
the public domain, while the author of a fanciful work can in any event rely
upon copyright of the underlying fictional story line as incentive enough.
Id. at 586. In Professor Gorman's view, there are many stylistic variations available for most fact
works, and the expression in such works should get no lesser protection than fanciful works. Id
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courts use the fact-expression dichotomy as a proxy for publicinterest rationales

A final problem with the fact-expression dichotomy is that it is often
used to disguise a public-interest rationale. This problem is, again, most
obvious in the case of news footage. Such footage may be more subject to
appropriation, but not because it lacks significant creativity. That is a
convenient legal fiction.
True, facts are free for the taking. But to the extent that someone can
copy news-related works wholesale, it is not because those works lack
expression. It is because the public interest in the works' dissemination trumps
the copyright holder's interest in their protection. After all, "the primary
purpose of copyright is not to reward the author, but ... to26 secure 'the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors."' 1
The fact-expression dichotomy forces courts to shoehorn publicinterest rationales into the confines of an entirely distinct doctrine. In Fuentes,
for instance, the Angola video was one-of-a-kind. It depicted high-level Cuban
officials, involved in the Angolan civil war, in a way that no other photographs
or videos could do. The videographer had traveled to Angola approximately
twenty times. The officials trusted him and treated him as an intimate. He had
access to them in a way that no other journalists could. Eventually, fourteen of
the officials were tried for, among other things, treason and drug trafficking,
and some of them were executed.262
Obviously, the public had a tremendous interest in a video of these
officials' behavior in Angola. And the court seemed to place some importance
on that interest. 263 But it based its opinion on the fair use defense, holding, as
mentioned above, somewhat disingenuously, that the video was factual rather
than creative (even though the videographer made various decisions that courts
normally view as evidence of creativity). 264 As Professor Nimmer has pointed
out, shoehorning issues into fair use which more properly belong under the
umbrella of free speech, is troublesome.26 5

Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 446 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (quoting
Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
262
Fuentes v. Mega Media Holdings, Inc., No. 09-22979-CIV, 2011 WL 2601356, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. June 9, 2011).
261

263

Id. at *15.

Id. at *14; see also L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 1992) (deeming
video tapes of airplane crash and train wreck factual, and citing three cases with explanatory
parentheticals focused on public-interest considerations).
265
Nimmer, supra note 168, at 1200-01.
264
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR A MORE-PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO STRAIGHT
PHOTOGRAPHY: SOMETHING OLD AND SOMETHING NEW

The fact-expression dichotomy, as applied to photography, is not only
antiquated, but ill-suited to the photographic medium. It provides limited
copyright protection for straight photographs, which are, by today's standards,
highly creative and valuable to the public discourse. Thus, courts need a moreprincipled approach to straight photographs. This Part presents one.
A.

Something Old: Substantial Similarity and the Non-Copyrightabilityof
Ideas

The substantial-similarity inquiry, discussed in detail above, requires
that courts distinguish facts from expression: If a defendant's work resembles a
plaintiffs work solely in terms of facts, the plaintiff will lose; there is no
infringement in such a case because facts are part of the public domain.26 6 If, on
the other hand, the defendant has borrowed substantially from the plaintiffs
expression, the plaintiff will win because expression is precisely what the
Copyright Act protects.267
The problem is that it is difficult, in the case of a straight photograph,
to excise the bare facts from the plastic elements. A photograph's visual facts
are intertwined with one another and with the photograph's overall
expression.2 68 They are not, like words, discrete packages of information. One
cannot simply pick them out of the expressive milieu. 2 9 Moreover, one should
not confuse a photograph's subject matter for its facts. 270 That said, it is
possible to differentiate facts from expression in straight photographs. The facts
can be found in the photograph's overarching ideas. The expression, in its
fundamental design elements.
1.

a photograph's facts reside in its overarching idea

First, a straight photograph's "facts" can be found in its overarching
ideas. In other words, the fact-expression dichotomy, strictly defined, does not
work, but its counterpart, the idea-expression dichotomy, does. Courts cannot
pluck facts from a photograph like they can words from a book. But they can
identify a photograph's principal idea, mentally exclude that idea, and restrict
their substantial-similarity inquiries to whatever remains.
266

See supra Part IV.B.

267

See supra Part IV.B.

268

See supra Part III.C.

But see Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (analyzing case in which defendant
took only one image out of the original photograph).
270
See supra Part IlI.C.
269
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Several cases employ this technique. They mostly involve pictorial
photographs, but their methodologies would apply equally well to straight
photographs. Take, for instance, Kaplan v. Stock Market Photo Agency, Inc. 2 7 1
The works at issue were staged, pictorial photographs. The original depicted a
businessman standing on the ledge of a tall building.272 The secondary work
depicted the same thing.2 73 The Southern District of New York noted that the
businessman-on-the-ledge theme was an unprotectable idea.274 Then, it
compared the two photographs' copyrightable elements: background,
perspective, lighting, shading, color, and the like.275 The stark differences in
these elements led the court to hold that the secondary work was not

infringing. 2 76
Four years later, the Southern District confronted a similar problem in
Bill Diodato Photography, LLC v. Kate Spade, LLC. 27 7 The plaintiffs

photograph showed a woman's shins and feet, visible under the door of a stall
in a public bathroom; 278 the defendant's photograph showed the same thing.2 7 9
Both photographs showcased high-fashion shoes and other accessories. The
court correctly held that the woman-sitting-on-a-toilet theme was an
unprotectable idea. 2 80 The photographs' remaining attributes-the ratio of
negative to positive space, the lighting, and the accessories28 -were so
different that the court granted summary judgment in the defendant's favor and
dismissed the complaint.2 82 Other courts have reached similar results using
similar methodologies. 28 3
The idea-expression dichotomy enabled all of these courts to isolate the
protectable elements in the plaintiffs' photographs. These were the things that
271
272

Kaplan v. Stock Mkt. Photo Agency, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 317, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

273

Id. at 468.

274

Kaplan, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
Id at 326-27.

275

276

Id. at 328.

277

388 F. Supp. 2d 382, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

278

Id. at 384.

279

Id. at 385. Interestingly, the defendant's work was a candid photograph. Id at 387.

280

Id. at 394-95.

281

Id. at 393.

2m2

Id. at 395.

See generally Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Haw.
2006) (holding that stained glass depicting hula dancer in traditional "ike" pose did not infringe
photograph of hula dancer in same stance); Gentieu v. Tony Stone Images/Chi., Inc., 255 F.
Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that copyright in photographs of, among other things,
babies on white backgrounds did not prevent others from photographing babies on white
backgrounds); cf Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(discussing straight photograph of salmon jumping into mouth of brown bear).
283
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courts traditionally view as creative, decisions relating to craft (e.g., choosing a
camera, film, and lenses), subject matter (e.g., selecting a venue and choosing a
focal point), and aesthetics (e.g., perspective, composition, and value
structure). 284 Some of them ran into the same sort of line-drawing problems that
plague the abstractions test. For example, in Kaplan, the plaintiff argued that
his photograph was about "'a person contemplating a leap from a city
building."' 285 The defendant argued that it was about "a 'distraught
businessman standing on the ledge of a tall city building."' 28 6 The court decided
that the plaintiff had "overgeneralize[d]" 2 87 and drew the line where the
defendant had suggested.
Thus, line-drawing problems are not insurmountable. Courts face and
resolve them all the time. Moreover, as Professor Leslie A. Kurtz has pointed
out, the "inquiry gains clarity and focus" in the context of both the plaintiffs
and defendant's works. 288 "It is unnecessary to determine at what hypothetical
point th[e] line is crossed, or whether other, hypothetical uses would
infringe." 2 89 The court merely needs to decide where the line is crossed with
respect to the specific works at issue.
2.

the compositional-equivalence test: finding a photograph's
expression in its basic design elements

In both Kaplan and Bill Diodato, the plaintiffs lost. The defendants had
borrowed (or independently duplicated) the plaintiffs' ideas. Otherwise, the
works differed significantly. Their expression was distinct. But what, exactly, is
expression? And how can courts isolate it from ideas?
If the copyright laws do not protect ideas, they must be using the word
"expression" to mean "form" as distinct from content. Definitions of
"expression" confirm this conclusion: according to the dictionary, expression is
"the manner . . . in which a thing is . . . [put] in[to] words; wording;

See supra Part IlI.C.
285
Kaplan v. Stock Mkt. Photo Agency, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 317, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(quoting Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
at 10, Kaplan v. Stock Mkt. Photo Agency, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 317 (2001) (No. 99 CIV.10218
AGS)).
286 Id. (quoting Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 10, Kaplan v. Stock Mkt. Photo Agency, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 317 (2001) (No. 99
CIV.10218 AGS)).
287
Id
288
Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1221, 1234 (1993).
284

289

id.
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phrasing." 2 90 It is "the stylistic characteristics of an utterance (opposed to
meaning)." 29 1 It is, in other words, form, not substance. In a book, it is not the
words, themselves, or their meanings; it is the selection and organization of
words-in aggregate.
For visual works, form is composition. And composition is "the
harmonious arrangement of the parts of a work of art in relation to each other
and to the whole." 29 2 It is the end result of the author's choice of focal point, his
manipulation of line, shape, texture, color, and tonality, and his use of rhythm,
movement, repetition, variety, balance, scale, and proportion. Taken alone,
these basic design elements may be facts.293 After all, one cannot copyright a
line or a shape. Taken together, however, they are expression: they are like
words woven together into a tapestry of meaning.
Courts should, therefore, in isolating expression, concentrate on the
original work's overall composition. In Kaplan, the case involving the
businessman-on-the-ledge idea, the court did just that. It noted that the
plaintiffs photograph was laid out horizontally, in landscape fashion,294 while
the defendant's photograph was laid out vertically, in portrait fashion. 2 95 It
observed that, in the plaintiffs photograph, the background was composed
almost entirely of the street below, whereas, in the defendant's, it was
composed of the building opposite. 2 9 6 It pointed out that the plaintiffs
photograph depicted an empty, worn, metallic ledge and that the defendant's
depicted a smooth, concrete ledge with a pigeon and a briefcase.2 97 These
compositional differences compelled the court to find for the defendant.
The same types of comparisons were at play in Bill Diodato, the case
involving photographs of women in public bathrooms. The plaintiffs

290

Expression, DICTIONARY.COM,

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/expression+

(last

visited Oct. 20, 2012).
291

292

Id.
Composition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/composition

(last
visited Oct. 20, 2012); cf Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884)
(using similar language).
293 Cf Paul M. Grinvalsky, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of the Intended
Audience in Music Copyright Infringement, 28 CAL. W. L. REv. 395, 416 (1992) ("The notes,
chords, and rhythms, by themselves, like words in literature, are in the public domain. They
cannot be copyrighted.") (footnote omitted).
294
Kaplan, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 326-27; see also Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp.
2d 444, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (showing photographs at issue in Kaplan).
295
Kaplan, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 327; see also Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 468 (showing
photographs at issue in Kaplan).
296
Kaplan, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 326-27.
297
Id. at 327.
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photograph showed a substantial portion of the bathroom floor and stall.298 The
defendant's photograph showed little floor and virtually no stall. 2 9 9 The floors
were different, the shoes were different, the purses were different, the garments
were different, the focuses were different, the depths of fields were different,
and the lighting was different. Compositionally, the works had virtually nothing
in common with one another. Thus, the court found for the defendant.300
Kaplan and Bill Diodato were easy cases in some respects. They
involved works that differed so fundamentally that any casual viewer, even a
lay one, could readily list the compositional differences. Nevertheless, the
defendants' attorneys could have driven the point home by creating templates
of the originals-simple, black-and-white line drawings of the originals' major
design features-and superimposing them over the allegedly infringing works.
A template of the plaintiffs' works would have had no relationship whatsoever
to the defendants' works. 301 And the plaintiffs would have been hard-pressed,
therefore, to argue that the defendants had copied their expression.
In Reece v. Island TreasuresArt Gallery,Inc.,302 the plaintiffs attorney
used just such an approach. He created a "transparent black and white overlay"
of the plaintiffs photograph and superimposed it upon a copy of the
defendant's allegedly infringing work. The tactic did not help the plaintiff,
but it did help the court (and the defendant). It enabled the court to detect
differences between the plaintiffs and defendant's compositions, and to hold
that the defendant's work was not substantially similar to the plaintiff s.30 4
298

Bill Diodato Photography, LLC v. Kate Spade, LLC, 388 F. Supp. 2d 382, 384 (S.D.N.Y.

2005).
299

Id at 385.

300
301

Id. at 384.

See e.g., Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 467-68 (showing that, in Kaplan, defendant's
photograph had significant compositional differences from plaintiffs photograph); Teresa Bruce,
Author's Image No. 1, UNIv. OF DENVER, http://www.law.du.edu/documents/Bruce/Appl.html
(last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (see Figure 1, showing significant compositional differences when a
template of the original work in Diodato is superimposed over the allegedly infringing work in
that case; id. (see Figure 2, showing significant compositional differences between plaintiff's and
defendant's works, from Diodato, when templates of both are superimposed over one another). In
Diodato, the defendant's photograph would look more like the plaintiffs photograph if the latter
image was cropped to exclude everything but its focal point, or "heart." Thus, one could give the
plaintiff (who was ultimately the losing party) the benefit of the doubt by comparing the
defendant's work only to the heart of the plaintiff's work. That said, the plaintiff would still lose:
the compositions are a bit more similar this way, but significant differences nonetheless remain.
OF
DENVER,
No.
2,
UNIv.
Author's
Image
Bruce,
See
Teresa
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/Bruce/App2.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (showing the
defendant's work as compared solely to the heart of the plaintiffs work).
302 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Haw. 2006).
303
Id. at 1207.
3
Id at 1208. I am not entirely sure that Reece was correctly decided. The central image in
the two works is strikingly similar, even given that both works depicted a dancer in a pose and
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This process-in which courts seek out compositional equivalencies
between supposedly similar works-seems to have played a role in Friedman v.
Guetta, 305 as well. There, the defendant made and sold various products based
on a copyrighted photograph of the hip-hop group Run-DMC.30 6 The products
portrayed the band members exactly as they had appeared in the original
photograph. In the court's words, "the distinct figures in [the p]laintiff s
[p]hotograph remain clearly visible and readily identifiable. In fact, the outline
of each figure is almost exactly replicated." 30 7 The court did not, presumably,
have an actual outline in front of it. But it was certainly visualizing one. A
forward-looking plaintiffs attorney could have spared the court this mental
exercise. She could have fashioned an actual, hard-copy template, based on the
plaintiffs photograph, and demonstrated to the court compositional-elementby-compositional-element that the defendant had appropriated protected
expression.
In fact, a compositional-equivalence test seems to explain many cases.
For example, in Straus v. DVC Worldwide, Inc., 308 the court held that various
photographs of golfer Arnold Palmer were not substantially similar. 30 9 The
pictures do resemble one another in certain respects. After all, they all depict
the same person. However, if one applies the compositional-equivalence test,
one sees that, compositionally, the photographs are very different.31 0 -Similarly,

wearing attire prescribed by a traditional dance, and even though the backgrounds are quite
different. Compare Kim Taylor Reece, Makanani (1988) (photograph), available at
(showing
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/dailypix/2007/Jan/31/FPI701310351ARb.jpg
plaintiffs copyrighted photograph), with Marylee Colucci, Nohe (1998) (stained glass), available
at http://www.hawaiiancouncil.org/docs/e-products/images/reece 2.jpg (showing defendant's
allegedly infringing stained glass). However, the defendant testified to having independently
created her work, and I must assume that the court judged her testimony to be credible. Reece,
468 F. Supp. 2d at 1199. If the plaintiff had been able to prove copying, the outcome may have
been different.
No. CV 10-00014 DDP (JCx), 2011 WL 3510890 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2011).
305
306
Id. at *1-*2.
307
Id. at *5 (emphasis added). Compare Glen E. Friedman, Untitled Portrait of Run-DMC
(1985) (photograph), available at http://www.photoattorney.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/
Friedman-photo-of-Run-DMC.jpg (showing original, copyrighted photograph), with Thierry
Guetta, Untitled Work (2008) (painting), available at http://www.boingboing.net/filesroot/
bwrecords.jpg (showing infringing artwork).
308
484 F. Supp. 2d 620, 638 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
309

id.

310
Compare id. at 650 app. A [hereinafter A Golfer's Life] (showing original), with id at 65152 apps. B, C [hereinafter Metro West and NicoDerm] (showing alleged copies); see also Teresa
Bruce, Author's Image No. 3, UNIV. OF DENVER, http://www.law.du.edu/documents/
Bruce/App3.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (showing outlines of original work superimposed
over allegedly infringing works) [hereinafter Author's Image No. 3]. In the Straus case, the
outlines of the allegedly infringing works are somewhat difficult to compare to the original works
due to the low quality of the images reproduced in the court's opinion. However, in the upper
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in Gentieu v. Tony Stone Images/Chicago, Inc., the plaintiffs photographs of
babies on white backgrounds resemble the defendants' photographs of babies
on white backgrounds. Compositionally, however, the works are very
different.3 H
The compositional-equivalence test also works in the well-known cases
of Rogers v. Koons3 12 and Blanch v. Koons.3 13 In Rogers, the court held that the
defendant's sculpture infringed the copyright in the plaintiffs photograph .314If
one compares the sculpture to the photograph, one sees that the compositions
are almost identical; a template of the plaintiffs photograph lines up very
closely with a photograph of the sculpture.3 15 In Blanch, in contrast, the court
held that the defendant's collage did not infringe the copyright in the plaintiffs
photograph.316 There, the template test would reveal significant compositional
differences. In fact, a line-drawing of the photograph's major design elements
would share nothing in common with the collage.

half of Author's Image No. 3, one can see that the right side of the head and shoulders and the
noses do not align. Moreover, by simply looking at A Golfer's Life, Metro West, and NicoDerm, it
is apparent that Palmer's expressions are different in the three works. See Straus, 484 F. Supp. 2d
at 650-52 apps. A-C. For example, he is smiling with his teeth showing in the original work and
has his mouth closed in the allegedly infringing works. Id. In addition, Palmer's right ear is only
visible in the original work. Id. Moreover, his shirts, the backgrounds, and the overall poses are
different (not to mention that he is visibly older in the defendants' works). Id. In the lower half of
Author's Image No. 3, one can also see significant differences between the original and allegedly
infringing work: Palmer's right shoulder, which is a significant part of the original composition,
does not appear in the defendant's work; the shirt collars, although both white, are configured
differently; Palmer's left shoulders are not aligned; and the ears do not align. Author's Image No.
3, supra.
311
See
Teresa
Bruce,
Author's
Image
No.
4,
UNIV.
OF
DENVER,
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/Bruce/App4.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (showing, on the
lower right, that the babies' shoulders, armpits, hairlines, eyes, noses, and mouths are not in
alignment).
312
960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
313
467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
314
See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 303.
3s
See
Teresa
Bruce,
Author's
Image
No.
5,
UNIV.
OF
DENVER,
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/Bruce/App5.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (showing that
infringing sculpture's composition is essentially identical to original photograph's composition).
316
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 244.
3
Compare Andrea Blanch, Silk Sandals (2000) (photograph), available at
http://www.owe.com/legalities/legalities30.htm (showing Blanch's original photograph), with
Jeff Koons, Niagra (2000) (collage), available at http://www.owe.com/legalities/legalities30.htm
(showing Koon's collage that uses original as small element).
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Something New: An Alternative Approach to the Second FairUse
Factor

This Section's second suggestion for a more-principled approach to
straight photographs has to do with the fair use doctrine's second factor, the
"nature of the copyrighted work." As demonstrated above, that factor becomes
an encumbrance instead of an asset when the original work is photographic in
nature. This Section proposes an alternative approach: it (1) sets forth a
procedure for designating a photograph either pictorial or straight and (2)
suggests using the traditional second-factor rules for pictorial photographs and
a balancing test for straight photographs.
1.

differentiating pictorial photographs from straight ones

Imagine a fair use case where the original work is a copyrighted
photograph. As with all such cases, the plaintiff will have proved copying via
an admission by the defendant or a showing of substantial similarity to the
original work; the secondary work will infringe the plaintiffs copyright in the
absence of a fair use finding.318
Now, imagine the court delving into the second fair use factor, "the
nature of the copyrighted work." The court should ask, first, whether the
photograph is pictorial or straight. The court does not have to judge the artistry
involved in a work, venturing outside its area of competency, 3 because the
question is an objective one. A photograph is pictorial if it is a non-candid
portrait or has been altered by hand.320 The author of a pictorial photograph will
have either staged the photograph, using models, backgrounds, props, and the
like, or manipulated the photograph after taking it, by, for instance, adding
artificial color or texture, altering the photograph to look like a painting, or
combining multiple images into one.
In the latter case, of a hand-worked photograph, the court should look
for after-the-fact 321 alterations that make the photograph look less realistic.
Other sorts of changes, like removing red-eye, do not amount to a rejection of
straight-photographic techniques. Thus, courts should not view such changes as
pictorial in nature.32 2

Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)
("[Slecondary users need invoke the fair use defense only where there is substantial similarity
between the original and allegedly infringing works, and thus actionable copying.").
319
See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 125, § 19E.04[B][1], at 19E-37 ("[L]iterary or
artistic interpretation . . . strains or exceeds judicial competence.").
320
This terminology obviously comes from the pre-digital era, but the concept, altering a
photograph via non-photographic techniques, can apply equally forcefully to digital photographs.
321
That is, alterations that occurred after the photographer shot the photograph.
322
Alternately, they can view such changes as de minimus.
318
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If the court cannot answer the question whether the photograph is
pictorial or straight by simply analyzing the photograph, it should consult the
record. In cases with well-developed records, and even in cases at the
summary-judgment stage, the court will likely have access to depositions or
affidavits detailing the original photographer's methodology.
2.

courts should apply the traditional creativity continuum to
pictorial photographs and a balancing test to straight
photographs

Ultimately, if the court concludes that the photograph is pictorial, it
should assess the second fair use factor in the traditional manner. It should
deem the photograph creative and hold the defendant to a higher standard on
the other fair use factors.
If, however, the court concludes that the photograph is straight, it
should abandon the traditional inquiry. Straight photographs are a mixture of
fact and expression. Therefore, the second factor's either-or choice between
creative or factual works is unhelpful. The court should, instead, focus on the
true essence of the second fair use factor. The factor's language, "the nature of
the copyrighted work," 32 3 comes from Justice Joseph Story's opinion in Folsom
v. Marsh, 4 a case that laid the foundations for the fair use doctrine. Folsom
presented the question whether a publisher could use excerpts from President
George Washington's private letters without permission. Justice Story held that
it could not.32 5 In so doing, he considered "the value of the materials taken" 326
from the original. According to Judge Pierre N. Leval, this language not only
begot the current "nature of' language, it clarifies that language: "Justice
Story's word choice . .. suggests that some . . [works are] more 'valued'

under copyright law than others."
Thus, the true essence of the second fair use factor is not whether a
work is fact or fantasy, published or unpublished, or the result of an investment
of time made in anticipation of financial reward.328 The true essence is whether
the original work is of a sort that the law should, as a matter of public policy,
either protect or disseminate.
Our hypothetical court, deliberating over its straight photograph,
should, then, at this juncture, ask itself: Would dissemination of this
323
324

325

17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006).
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
Id. at 345.

326

Id. at 348.
Leval, supra note 188, at 1117; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 586 (1994) (discussing the origins of the "nature of' phrase).
328
These are the three traditional inquiries under the second fair use factor. E.g., Haberman v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 211-12 (D. Mass. 1986).
327
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photograph advance or impede the goals of the Copyright Act? Does the
public's need for dissemination outweigh the original author's need for
protection? Is the defendant's purpose a core purpose, like "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching. . . , scholarship, or research"? 329 How
much access does the public already have to this sort of information? 330 How
much reward do authors need to create photographs like this one? 33 1 It should,
in other words, balance the plaintiffs need for protection against the public's
need for dissemination. 3 32
This balancing test will result in a decision that favors the defendant
when the photographic work: (a) has become evidentiary in nature or (b)
contains demonstrative expression.
a.

the second fair use factor should favor the defendant if
the original photograph has become evidentiary in
nature

Professor Nimmer has given the paradigmatic examples of
photographic works that have become evidentiary in nature: photographs of the
My Lai massacre and Abraham Zapruder's film of President John. F.
Kennedy's assassination. In his view, the free-speech value of these documents
outweighs the values advanced by copyright laws (to encourage people to
create new works by rewarding them for doing so). 33 3

329
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). Of course, our hypothetical court may have already addressed this
question, about the defendant's purpose, in its resolution of the first fair use factor.
330
Thus, the court should consider whether information about a certain issue is especially
scarce. Cf Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (discussing the Copyright Term
Extension Act, which takes into account whether a work is already being exploited commercially
or is unavailable); Monster Commc'ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490, 494
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that "only a finite number of photographers capture images of a given
historical event").
331
According to Professor Nimmer, the law should keep "the price as low as possible-no
more than is needed to provide authors a bare incentive to create." 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 125, § 19E.01[D], at 19E-7.
332 Professor Gorman agrees that the second fair use factor involves consideration whether the
original work embodies information of great public value. Gorman, supra note 197, at 597.
Professor Elliott Abramson has suggested that the second fair use factor is superfluous because
the fact-expression dichotomy already protects the public's need for information. Elliot M.
Abramson, How Much Copying Under Copyright? Contradictions,Paradoxes,Inconsistencies,
61 TEMP. L. REv. 133, 156 (1988). He also questions whether the public has more of an interest
in receiving factual information than in receiving other information, say artistic or inspirational
information. Id I think Professor Abramson's questions are provocative and worth considering.
The latter question, about the public's need for non-factual information, raises the possibility that
allowing dissemination of photographs that have become evidentiary in nature is unprincipled
and potentially a slippery slope leading to dissemination of all sorts of non-factual photographs.
333 See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 125, § 19E.03.
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In the case of the My Lai photographs, "a denial that ... any deaths
had occurred would have been devastatingly refuted by the photographs in a
way that the verbal reports of the deaths simply could not do."334 Thus, such
photographs had become, in a sense, evidentiary. Whatever their expressive
content-and I think that content is significant-they are also evidence of some
fact in the world. They help to establish the truth of the matter, that reports of a
massacre were more likely accurate than not. Moreover, presumably, the
defendants using them would be news organizations, discharging one of the
Copyright Act's core purposes. In addition, the My Lai photographs were oneof-a-kind. They were the best truth-approximating evidence available to the
public.
In short, the My Lai photographs scream "dissemination" in answer to
almost every question our hypothetical court would be asking itself. And so
does the Zapruder film: "[I]n the welter of conflicting versions of what
happened that tragic day in Dallas, the Zapruder film gave the public
authoritative answers that it desperately sought; answers that no other source
could supply with equal credibility." 35 The film had become evidentiary,
making various alleged facts more or less likely to be true. 3 36 The defendant
wanted to disseminate portions of the film (in the form of drawings) for a core
purpose (a book questioning the Warren Commission's findings). And the film
was one-of-a-kind, the only photographic record of the assassination.3 37
There is only one question that the My Lai photographs and the
Zapruder film do not answer definitively in favor of dissemination: How much
reward does a photojournalist or other individual need to create works of this
sort in the first instance? The question is an important one. It is easy to tell
oneself that photojournalists answer to a higher power, that they are above the
arguably greed-based incentive system in the Copyright Act. 3 And that may
be true when a non-professional author, like Zapruder, originates a newsworthy
piece due merely to the fortuity of being in the right place at the right time.
In most cases, though, a photojournalist needs to make a living. She
needs to put food on the table. And she needs organizational backing:
colleagues who can identify the world's "hot spots," travel allowances, camera
equipment, local contacts, lodging, logistical support, and so forth. News-

Nimmer, supra note 168, at 1198.
Id.
336
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 125, § 19E.03[A][2], at 19E-22 ("[I]n the welter of
conflicting versions of what happened that tragic day in Dallas, the Zapruder film gave the public
authoritative answers that it desperately sought; answers that no other source could supply with
equal credibility.").
3
See also L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1992) (considering scarcity
of news footage).
338
Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951,
1021 (2004).
334
3
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gathering is arguably just as much a core First-Amendment activity as newsreporting. 3 And the Copyright Act cannot facilitate the latter without
rewarding the former.340
Professor Nimmer recognizes this conundrum, and he suggests a
compulsory-license approach to ensure both that the public gets crucial
information and that news organizations receive adequate funding.34 1 In other
words, in cases where our hypothetical court found it necessary to allow
dissemination of a copyrighted work, after subjecting the work to the questions
listed above, it could also order the defendant to pay for its use of the material
(or-better yet-Congress could amend the Copyright Act to provide for such
licenses). This approach should satisfy potential critics, those who would argue
that according lesser rights to "works that are of greatest importance to the
public" is "fundamentally at odds" with the Copyright Act's overall scheme.342
Another potential criticism of this balancing test is that it would be
overinclusive, which would result in a finding of dissemination for every
poignant news photograph. That, however, is not the case. The test would, for
example, favor protection (not dissemination) in the case of Patrick Ferrell's
Pulitzer Prize winning photographs of Haiti in the aftermath of Hurricane
Ike.34 3 Those photographs were not principally evidentiary. They did not, in
general, serve a truth-finding function. And they were not the only source of
information about the disaster. The same would be true of the many powerful
photographs of the 911 disaster.

339
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) ("[W]ithout some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."); Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right
to Gather News: A Sequential Interpretationof the First Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 113, 189 (2008).
340
See Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1497 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Robert A.
Gorman, Copyright Protectionfor the Collection and Representation ofFacts, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1569, 1576 (1963) ("The public concern for rapid and accurate dissemination of news is obvious;
the newsgatherer's concern for the protection of his efforts in the fiercely competitive field of
news coverage is equally so.").
341
Nimmer, supra note 168, at 1199.
342
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558-59 (1985) ("In
our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright
itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.").
343
See The 2009 Pulitzer Prize Winners: Breaking News Photography: Works, THE PULITZER
PRIZES, http://www.pulitzer.org/works/2009-Breaking-News-Photography (last visited Sept. 18,
2012).
34
Of course, if one of those photographs was in a unique position to prove or disprove some
of the conspiracy theories about 9/11 or some other disputed question about the timing of events,
the damage to the buildings, or the like, there would be a different result.
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A benefit of the balancing test is that it would provide courts with
more-consistent rationales. For example, in Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 345
the district court held that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs' photographs was
fair. The photographs were straight photographs of the plaintiffs' wedding.3 4 6
The court, hamstrung with the traditional bifurcation of creative and factual
It did
works, held that the photographs were "essentially factual [in] nature.
so even though the photographs necessitated the same sorts of choices about
craft, representation, and aesthetics that courts typically view as creative
choices.
The real reason for the court's holding was that the photographs had
become evidentiary in nature. The plaintiffs were celebrities who had secretly
married. The defendants published the photographs, without the couple's
permission, to prove the marriage. 3 4 8 There is no reason why the court should
have deemed the photographs uncreative under the second fair use factor.
The proposed balancing test would have enabled the court to deem the
photographs creative under the second fair use factor. It could have also held
that the defendant used the photographs fairly. It could have explained that the
photographs had come to serve a truth-approximating function and that the
public's interest in dissemination, therefore, trumped the newlyweds' interest in
protection. 349

345
No. CV 09-5077-R, 2010 WL 3835053 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2010), rev'd, 688 F.3d 1164
(9th Cir. 2012).
346
Id. at *2-*3.

347

Id. at *2.

348

Id. at *1-*2,

349
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, instructing it to award summary
judgment in the plaintiffs' favor. See Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1184 (9th
Cir. 2012). There are two aspects of the Ninth Circuit's decision that are relevant to this Article.
First, the court held that the district court had erred in concluding that the photographs at issue
were factual rather than creative:
Simply because a photo documents an event does not turn a pictorial
representation into a factual recitation . ... Photos that we now regard as
iconic often document an event-whether the flight of the Wright Brothers'
airplane, the sailor's kiss in Times Square on V-J Day, the first landing on
the moon, or the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Id. at 1177. In other words, the court recognized, just as this Article does, that the district court's
handling of the second fair use factor was not in keeping with a modern perspective on straight
photographs. Second, the court engaged in an analysis very similar to the evidentiary exception
proposed here. It described the photographs at issue as "photographic evidence that constitutes
proof of a newsworthy event." Id. at 1174. But it concluded that this alone did not absolve the
defendants of wrongdoing, noting that "publication of photographic evidence ... is not
automatically fair use"; that "[t]he photos were not . .. necessary to prove th[e] controverted
fact-the marriage certificate, which is a matter of public record, may have sufficed"; and that
"[e]ven absent official documentation, one clear portrait depicting the newly married couple in
wedding garb with the priest [rather than six] would certainly have sufficed to verify the
clandestine wedding." Id at 1174-75, 1179. In other words, the court essentially applied the
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the second fair use factor should favor the defendant if
the original photograph contains demonstrative
expression

The second fair use factor should also favor the defendant when the
original, copyrighted photograph contains something I call "demonstrative
expression." This is expression that has, itself, become a fact in controversy. It
is not important for its substance, but, rather, for its style.
The classic example of such expression is President Ford's reference to
the White House tapes as a "smoking gun."350 Most commentators view this as
a case of merger, in which the idea and its expression became inseparably
wedded.35 However, Professor Jay Dratler has offered a better explanation,
that President Ford's expression became fact because its style was provocative,
not because of merger:
This phrase of Ford's became fact, not through any merger of
expression and idea, but because the manner and vividness of
the expression were themselves historical facts of considerable
importance.
The argument that expression itself is a fact or "news" should
not be confused with the doctrine of merger of idea and
expression. Under the "merger" doctrine, copyright does not
protect the expression of an idea when there are only a limited
number of ways to express it. In contrast, the "expression as
fact" argument may apply when there are many ways to
express the same idea, but a particular person's choice of one
of those ways is itself a newsworthy event. The argument is
analogous to the rule of evidentiary law for verbal acts, which
admits evidence of statements made outside a courtroom as
non-hearsay when the statements themselves are operative
facts. 352
Other examples of expression-as-fact, or demonstrative expression, include a
"biographer [who] sought to support a portrait of his subject as a liar by
showing he had lied; as a bigot by showing he had made bigoted

evidentiary exception proposed here, determining that either: (1) a necessary prerequisite to
applying the exception-that the photograph in question be the only evidence, or nearly so, of a
fact in question-was absent or (2) if the prerequisite was satisfied, and the six photographs at
issue were the only evidence of the marriage, the defendants might have been able to use one
photograph without permission without running afoul of copyright laws. Id.
350
E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
351
See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 125, § 19E.03.
352
Jay Dratler, Jr., Distillingthe Witches'Brew ofFair Use in CopyrightLaw, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 233, 306 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
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pronouncements; as pompous and self-important by quoting self-important

statements."3 5 3
These examples of expression-as-fact all involve literary works. But
the phenomenon can also apply to photographs and other graphic works. For
example, in the aftermath of Nicole Brown Simpson's murder, Time Magazine
famously altered O.J. Simpson's mug shot, making his complexion look darker
than it really is. 3 54 The mug shot became a matter of controversy, and
newsworthy, not because of its substance, but because of its style, the way in
which Time had altered it.
Our hypothetical court, encountering this photograph, would resolve
the second fair use factor in favor of dissemination. Its rationale would be that
the photograph had become demonstrative expression. It would not need to use
the legal fiction that the photograph was uncreative. 355 Secondary users could
publish the photograph without Time's permission because the photograph's
expression, itself, regardless of the substance it conveyed, had become a fact in
which the public had an interest.
Nunez, the case involving the racy photographs of Miss Puerto Rico,
provides another example of photographic expression becoming fact. The
photographs at issue in the case were not newsworthy because they depicted
Miss Puerto Rico; instead, they were newsworthy because of the way in which
they depicted her.356 If our hypothetical court confronted the Nunez case, it
would acknowledge that the photographs were creative, in keeping with
precedent (unlike the real Nunez court), but it would also deem them
demonstrative expression, thus allowing the defendant to disseminate them
without the plaintiffs' permission (assuming, of course, that the other fair use
factors also suggested such an outcome).
C.

Examples: Applying the Concepts of CompositionalEquivalence,
Truth-Approximation, and DemonstrativeExpression to Straight
Photographs

The Parts above suggested new approaches for evaluating substantial
similarity and the nature of the copyrighted work. This Part will apply those
new approaches to several well-known straight photographs.

3
Leval, supra note 188, at 1113-14.
354 See Oleg Tukh, Falsification of History, http://www.tc.umn.edu/~hick0088/classes/
csci 2101/false.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2012). This webpage contains several examples of
photographs that illustrate the expression-as-fact phenomenon. Id.
355 One interesting aspect of this example is that Time arguably handworked the mug shot,
which would make it pictorial. Id. On the other hand, the better view is probably that this did not
amount to handworking; it was not a technique that rejected the straight-photographic "look." Id.
356 See supra Part IV.C.2.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

59

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 11

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

152

1.

[Vol. 115

the Obama "Hope" bumpersticker

First, consider Mannie Garcia's now-famous photograph of thensenator Barack Obama attending a press conference on Darfur, Sudan. Shepard
Fairey admitted to copying the photograph, but a court evaluating the case
would still have to consider whether the bumpersticker was substantially
similar to the photograph in terms of that photograph's protectable elements.357
In other words, the court would have to apply the fact-expression dichotomy.
Initially, the court would differentiate between the photograph's ideas
and its expression. In Kaplan, the photographs were allegorical, depicting
businessmen standing on skyscrapers' ledges. They depicted familiar scenes
from the cultural narrative. Thus, the idea was easy to pinpoint. With a straight
photograph, like Garcia's, however, the expression is more subtle. The idea
was, perhaps, a politician showing concern. Or maybe it was Senator Obama,
who was, even then, raising speculation about a presidential run, looking
presidential.
Regardless, the court's next step, identifying the photograph's
expression, clarifies matters. The court could, sua sponte, as a matter of judicial
notice, take account of the photograph's major compositional elements.
Preferably, an attorney would provide the court with this information, making a
template of the original work. Either way, the court would then conduct a
compositional-equivalence test. It would superimpose the template upon the
secondary work to see if the secondary artist borrowed protected expression.
That test would show, with regard to Garcia's photograph and Fairey's
bumpersticker, that the two pieces are compositionally equivalent. In fact,
Fairey took Garcia's composition wholesale, with hardly any changes at all. 3 5 8
Even those who embrace the metaphor of a thin copyright would have to say
that Fairey took too much: thin copyrights protect against exact copying and
that appears to be just what Fairey did.
That does not, however, end the inquiry. The court would have to
consider Fairey's fair use defense. In assessing the second factor, the court
would, applying the suggestions above, deem Garcia's photograph straight and
bypass the ordinary question about whether the photograph was creative or
factual. Then, it would balance Garcia's need for the photograph's protection

3
See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 125, § 13.03[A], at 13-37 ("Just as copying is an
essential element of copyright infringement, so substantial similarity between the plaintiff's and
defendant's works is an essential element of actionable copying. 'This means that even where the
fact of copying is conceded, no legal consequences will follow from that fact unless the copying
is substantial."' (footnotes omitted) (quoting Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir.
2004))).
358
See
Teresa
Bruce,
Author's
Image
No.
6,
UNIV.
oF
DENVER,
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/Bruce/App6.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (showing that an
outline of Fairey's work superimposed over Garcia's, rotated slightly clockwise, duplicates
Garcia's composition).
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against the public's need for its dissemination. The public's need would trump
Garcia's need if the photograph had become evidentiary or if it contained
demonstrative expression.
Garcia would prevail on both counts. First, the court would not deem
the photograph evidentiary. After all, there was no question about Obama
having actually attended the conference, about whether he was paying attention
at the conference, about whether his suit was too expensive, or the like. In other
words, the photograph does not help to establish the truth of some
controversial, public matter.
Second, the court would not characterize the photograph as
demonstrative expression. Fairey could not credibly make an expression-as-fact
argument. He was not commenting on the photograph's style, and there is
nothing about that style that is in and of itself significant to the public
discourse. It is still possible that Fairey could prevail, overall, in our
hypothetical case, dependinp on the outcome of the other three fair use factors,
but my bets are on Garcia."
2.

Alfred Stieglitz's The Steerage

Now, consider Alfred Stieglitz's masterpiece, The Steerage.3 60 Suppose
Stieglitz had a valid copyright on The Steerage. Suppose further that I
downloaded the piece off of the Internet and used it as the basis for my
immigrant rights poster, Liberty.16 If Stieglitz sued me for copyright
infringement, the court would initially consider whether the two works were
substantially similar.
The idea, immigrants on a steamship, would be unprotectable. But the
expression, embodied in the composition, would be. With expression in mind,
my poster may, at first glance, seem very different from Stieglitz's photograph.
The poster is an impressionistic piece, complete with brush strokes and soft
edges. The photograph, in contrast, is naturalistic, straight, with hard lines and

3
This assumes a hypothetical case in which Garcia still retained the copyright to his
photograph and in which the secondary work was a bumpersticker instead of, say, a poster. In the
real case, the Associated Press owned the copyright to Garcia's photograph and the secondary
works were posters and other merchandise. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and
Injunctive Relief, Fairey v. Assoc. Press, No. 09-01123 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009),
available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/biguploads/Faireyv APcomplaintwith-exhibits.pdf;
Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims of Defendant, The Associated Press, Fairey v.
Assoc.
Press,
No.
09-01123
(AKH)
(S.D.N.Y.
Mar.
11,
2009),
available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2009cv01123/
340121/13/0.pdf~ts=1236870878.
360
Stieglitz, supra note 75.
361
Teresa
Bruce,
Author's
Image
No.
7,
UNIv.
OF
DENVER,
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/Bruce/App7.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (showing, on top
half, the image created by the Author).
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little texture. The people, so individual in Stieglitz's work, are blurry and
anonymous in mine. Even the lighting in the two pieces appears to be quite
different: Stieglitz's feels sunny, bleak, and stark. Mine feels dark and
atmospheric.
The compositional-equivalence test shows, however, that the
expression is substantially similar. The compositions are the same.3 62 I have
unquestionably taken more than just Stieglitz's idea. I have taken his manner of
expressing that idea. I could argue that my work is fair, but Stieglitz's
photograph is neither evidentiary, rare proof of some fact in the world, nor
demonstrative, expression-as-fact. Thus, barring some slam-dunk on one of the
other fair use factors, I will likely lose my case.
3.

Gary Hart, Monkey Business

Finally, imagine yourself in 1987. Senator Gary Hart, a married man
and a rising star in the Democratic party, has been accused of womanizing. He
denies the allegation, daring the press to put a tail on him. They do. Or, at least,
they dig up some dirt on him. The National Enquirer obtains a photograph of
Senator Hart with aspiring actress/model Donna Rice on his lap.363 They are
sitting on a dock waiting to board a luxury yacht, called, appropriately,
"Monkey Business." Imagine further that the photographer, Hart's friend,
objects to the photograph's dissemination.364 He sues the Enquirer for
copyright infringement. There is no substantial-similarity question: the
Enquirerhas published the photograph without any alterations.
Is the use fair? Certainly. And that would presumably be the outcome
even applying traditional fair use methodologies. However, under the
methodology suggested above, the court does not have to deem the photograph
factual, even though it displays all of the same creative characteristics that
courts typically-in cases that do not involve a strong public interest-consider
creative. Instead, it can recognize that the photograph has become evidentiary.
The photograph makes the allegations against Hart more likely true than not.
And it is rare. It is the only evidence of its kind. The citizens deserve to see it
and judge the matter for themselves. The friend's interest in protection must
give way to the public's interest in dissemination.

See id. (showing, on bottom half, an outline of Stieglitz's photograph superimposed over
my poster).
National Enquirer, Untitled Photo of Gary Hart and Donna Rice (1987) (photograph),
availableat http://www.people.com/people/gallery/O,,687082_717846,00.html.
3
This is purely hypothetical.
362
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VI. CONCLUSION

Photography has captivated and confounded humanity since its
inception. It is both a science and an art. But the latter title did not come easily.
Alfred Stieglitz battled in the early 1900s for photography's acceptance as a
fine art. He won the battle, but the victory was, at first, Pyrrhic. It was based on
a pictorial ethic. This ethic held that photography was an art form only insofar
as it resembled the traditional arts, painting, drawing, printmaking, and
sculpture. Later, Stieglitz and others recognized pictorialism's limitations. They
advocated for straight photography, an aesthetic that was true to the camera's
distinctive qualities and, in particular, its realism. Today, straight photography
is the dominant photographic aesthetic.
Unfortunately, copyright law has not embraced that aesthetic. In 1865,
Congress expressly listed photographs in the Copyright Act. Some twenty years
later, litigants challenged that legislation, arguing that machines produced
photographs, not human beings, and that photographs, therefore, lacked
originality. The Supreme Court disagreed, declaring that photographs were
authored by people; that they, in other words, had originators; and that they
accordingly satisfied the Constitution's originality requirement. It based its
decision on the then-prevailing pictorial ethic: photographs were original
because photographers used models, elicited expressions, posed sitters, staged
backgrounds, and otherwise altered reality.
Subsequently, courts declared all sorts of photographs, both pictorial
and straight, original. Now, in fact, almost any photograph, save those that
deliberately attempt exact duplication of copyrighted works, can satisfy the
originality requirement. A pictorial ethic has, however, lingered in other areas
of copyright law. It appears in particular in the fact-expression dichotomy, a
doctrine requiring that facts be free for the taking; the copyright laws only
protect the expression of facts, not the facts themselves. This is because the
Copyright Act's ultimate goal is to promote the progress of science and the arts.
Scientists and artists build on those who go before them. Thus, allowing
scientists and artists to freely take facts from their predecessors promotes the
public good.
The fact-expression dichotomy, as applied to photography, has several
shortcomings. For example, it uses rules designed for literature on a medium
that is fundamentally different from literature. It is a relatively simple process
to distinguish individual words used in an academic paper from the exact
phrasing of those words. The individual words may be unprotected facts, but
the phrasing is copyrightable expression. The exercise is not, however, so
simple in the case of a straight photograph. Distinguishing that photograph's
facts from its expression is often impossible because the two are inseparably
wed. Visual facts are not discrete packages, like facts expressed in words.
Additionally, the fact-expression dichotomy privileges pictorial
photographs over straight ones. This occurs most commonly in the context of
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the fair use defense. Courts applying the second fair use factor reflexively deem
pictorial photographs creative and straight ones factual. They do not typically
acknowledge that works can be both factual and creative. This means that
straight photographs automatically receive less protection from copying than
pictorial photographs.
Finally, courts often use the fact-expression dichotomy, clumsily, as a
proxy for public-interest rationales. They designate a straight photograph
factual even though it displays all of the same characteristics that would,
outside the public-interest context, result in a finding of creativity. In other
words, they rely on a legal fiction. They do so because they recognize that the
defendant should be allowed to disseminate the copyrighted work, but the
copyright laws have not given them the tools to express that rationale directly.
Ultimately, the fact-expression dichotomy provides limited copyright
protection for straight photographs, which are, by today's standards, highly
creative and valuable to the public discourse. Copyright law should not
penalize photography for characteristics that are inherent to the medium. The
courts need a more-principled approach. This Article attempts to present one. It
suggests that fact-bound works have a "porous" copyright, not a "thin" one.
The metaphor of a porous copyright does not, in contrast to the metaphor of a
thin copyright, embed the assumption that non-fiction contains little expression,
little that copyright would protect. It indicates that copyright will give way to
some degree, and in some area, but not in any preordained proportion.
The Article also suggests that courts evaluating straight photographs
use a "compositional-equivalence" test to isolate facts from expression. This
test involves the creation, either mentally or in fact, of a template showing the
copyrighted work's major design elements. The court superimposes the
template over the allegedly infringing work. If that work has duplicated the
copyrighted work's composition-if, stated differently, there is an equivalence
between the template and the allegedly infringing work-the defendant has
taken protected expression. This test seems to explain many of the precedents
in the straight-photography arena.
The Article suggests, in addition, that courts assessing photographs
take a different approach to the second fair use factor. First, it suggests that
they differentiate pictorial from straight photographs. Second, it suggests that,
in the case of straight photographs, courts abandon the normal "is-it-creativeor-factual?" inquiry in favor of a balancing test. That balancing test would
weigh the copyright holder's interest in protection against the public's interest
in dissemination. There are two instances in which the public's interest would
trump the copyright holder's interest: when a photograph has become
"evidentiary in nature," and when a photograph contains "demonstrative
expression."
Photographs like those of the My Lai massacre and Gary Hart with
Donna Rice on his lap are evidentiary in nature. The former prove the truth of a
massacre that some people denied had happened. The latter proves that
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allegations of Hart's infidelity were more likely true than not. All of them serve
a truth-approximating function. And all of them were rare, essentially the only
evidence the public had at its disposal.
Photographs like O.J. Simpson's mug shot and Miss Puerto Rico's
modeling portfolio contain demonstrative expression. Time Magazine had
altered the mug shot so that Simpson's complexion appeared darker than it
really is. The public had an interest in the photograph, not because it depicted
Simpson, but because of the way in which it depicted Simpson. Miss Puerto
Rico had distributed photographs that showed her nude or nearly nude. Some
portion of the public believed that this was inappropriate, given her title. They
were interested in the photographs, not because they depicted Miss Puerto
Rico, but because of the way in which they depicted her. In such a situation, the
public must have access to the photograph in order to adequately analyze the
controversy.
All in all, courts are doing a relatively good job in terms of outcomes.
The cases, usually, are rightly decided. The problem is that the courts have
been given the wrong tools for the job. It is like they are using a hammer to turn
screws. And their rationales suffer. This Article has attempted to offer courts
the right tools for the job in the hopes that their rationales, which, at the end of
the day, may be even more important than outcomes, will benefit.
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